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Senegal benefits from political stability and a favorable geographic location, but economic 
performance since independence has been disappointing, with resulting pervasive 
underemployment, especially for women and youth.  This policy brief assesses the prospects for 
boosting employment through export-led growth, making use of the product-space framework.  
The central concept is to diversify exports into increasingly “complex” products embodying 
sophisticated capabilities.  We depart from the usual product-space approach, however, in arguing 
that Senegal can foster increasing complexity and employment growth within existing product 
lines with strong comparative advantage by improving product quality and cost-competitiveness.  
To do so will require addressing long-standing weaknesses in the business climate, particularly 
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1 Introduction: the Senegal Paradox 
In this paper, we study Senegal’s participation in the world economy and implications for 
employment opportunities through use of the product space framework and follow-up detailed 
analysis of industries with promising export potential.  The product space provides a convenient 
and synthetic framework for analyzing a country’s export pattern and suggesting possible 
diversification options and thus structural transformation of the economy.  In a number of studies, 
Hausmann and his colleagues have explored the relationship between a country’s export 
composition and its economic development. They found evidence that wealthier countries tend to 
export more diversified baskets of goods that include technologically complex products. Their 
findings suggest that the path to prosperity passes through export diversification. In this study, we 
apply methods developed by Hausmann and his colleagues to analyze Senegal’s export structure 
and help identify areas of actual and potential comparative advantage and more specifically those 
sectors with greatest opportunities for boosting employment of women and youth.   
However, it is also important to understand the limitations of the product space framework 
for small low-income countries with very limited export structures.  While the product-space is 
based on the concept of capabilities, these are measured indirectly through measures of revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA), based on actual exports.  Patterns of RCA are a useful starting 
point in ascertaining productive capabilities, but awareness of the limitations of the data are very 
important.  In particular, many products which have apparent positive RCA are often simply re-
exports of imported products.  It is therefore essential to use prior knowledge of the economy and 
on-site investigations to understand the most promising avenues for export diversification and 
structural transformation. 
Senegal is one of the most stable democracies in Africa, with fair elections, ethnic harmony 
and religious tolerance.  The country is well situated on the coast of West Africa to access markets 
in Europe and North America. Its limited resource endowment has shielded it from the “resource 
curse” of economic distortion, corruption and violence associated with mineral rents.  While 
rainfall is erratic, irrigation potential is considerable. Yet economic performance since 
independence in 1960 has been disappointing.  Social indicators such as life expectancy and 
literacy have improved, but per capita real GDP is barely above the level of 60 years ago, poverty 
remains pervasive and underemployment in the informal sector is the norm.  Using the World Bank 
thresholds of poverty of $3.10 per day, two thirds of the population were poor in 2011, nearly 
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unchanged from 2005 although somewhat better than in the early 1990s when the rate was over 
80%.  Meanwhile, less than 10% of the workforce is employed in private and public formal sector 
jobs with regular salary, health and retirement benefits and other social protections (Golub and 
Hayat 2015). 
Figure 1 shows real per capita GDP for Senegal and a few other developing countries, 
Korea, China and Botswana.  In 1960, Senegal’s per capita GDP was about the same as Korea’s 
at $1000 2010 US dollars.  China and Botswana’s per capita GDP were well below that.  Fast 
forward to 2015, and Senegal’s per capita GDP is around the level in 1960.  Meanwhile Korea has 
become a developed country and other East Asian countries have far surpassed Senegal.  In Africa, 
success stories such as Botswana and Mauritius have also done well, showing that rapid growth is 
not exclusively an Asian phenomenon.   
The consequences of this lackluster growth for employment and well-being have been 
devastating, especially for youth and women.  The vast majority of the labor force is confined to 
the informal sector, characterized by very low incomes and minimal job security (Golub and Hayat 
2015; Golub, Mbaye and Chwe 2015).   
 
Figure 1: GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) 
 
Source World Bank World Development Indicators 
 
What explains this dismal economic performance in the face of seemingly favorable 
geographic and political circumstances and what can be done about it?  The historical evidence is 
clear that rapid growth, structural transformation, and employment creation in the formal sector 
require integration into the world economy through exports of labor-intensive goods, even if the 
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country (Golub, O’Connell and Du 2008).   And integration into the world economy requires global 
competitiveness.  So, what is holding back Senegal’s competitiveness? This is an issue the authors 
of this paper have addressed previously (Golub and Mbaye 2002; Mbaye and Golub 2003; Golub, 
Ceglowski, Mbaye and Prasad 2018).  Other recent contributions on Senegal’s economic 
performance and international trade include IMF (2017), English (2016), MCC (2017), Mbaye and 
Gueye (2015).   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief overview 
of Senegal’s economic history and policies since Independence.  Section 3 describes Senegal’s 
dismal employment situation, particularly regarding women and youth.  Section 4 outlines the 
product space methodology.  Section 5 provides a macroeconomic perspective on Senegal’s 
exports.  Section 6 applies the product space methodology to Senegal’s export structure, in an 
effort to discern those sectors that have actual and potential comparative advantage and are labor-
intensive.  Section 7 discusses the most promising sectors that emerge from the product space 





2 Overview of Senegal’s Economic Performance and Policies since 
Independence 
In the first two decades following independence in 1960, under President Leopold Senghor, 
Senegal adopted a policy inspired by “African Socialism” and the then widely-accepted import-
substitution model, involving high levels of import taxation and widespread government 
intervention in markets, benefiting incumbent (often French-owned) firms and restricting 
competition (Geller 1995; Mbaye and Golub 2003; Golub and Mbaye 2002; Cissé, Choi and 
Maurel 2014).   Even for that era, Senegal’s policies involved an extraordinary degree of 
complexity, intrusiveness, and discretion, providing substantial opportunities for corruption and 
rent-seeking behavior.  As a result of its role as the capital of colonial French West Africa and the 
high levels of protection in the post-Independence period, Senegal had a relatively developed albeit 
inefficient industrial base for light industry, particularly textiles (Boone 1989).  
Senegal has also maintained a fixed exchange rate as part of the West African Economic 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) with common currency--the CFA franc--pegged to the French Franc 
and subsequently the Euro1.  The high levels of economic inefficiency and corruption combined 
with an overvalued exchange rate inhibited Senegal’s exports and contributed to a balance of 
payments crisis in the early 1980s.  Smuggling via The Gambia became endemic (Boone 1989, 
Golub and Mbaye 2009). Beginning in the late 1980s, Senegal instituted a series of reform 
packages, liberalizing trade and promoting exports. These reforms had limited success in boosting 
competitiveness and exports. The 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc by 50% along with further 
reforms succeeded in raising growth moderately to an average of 4.5% for the next decade, leading 
to small increases in per capita income that partially offset the decline during the 1980s crisis 
(English 2016).   
Even before the end of the import-substitution era, Senegal adopted a number of measures 
to spur exports and industrial development, including the Dakar Industrial Free Trade Zone (ZFID) 
established in 1974 within which firms could benefit from a variety of incentives for exporting.  
The ZFID was unsuccessful in attracting export-oriented foreign or domestic investment. From the 
1980s to the present day there have been numerous subsequent government initiatives and 
strategies to promote export diversification and growth, and they too have had limited success at 
                                                 
1 WAEMU replaced the West African Economic Monetary Union (WAMU) in 1994. 
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best. These included the New Industrial Policy (NPI) in 1986, the reforms associated with the 1994 
devaluation, particularly the Private Sector Adjustment and Competitiveness Operation (PASCO), 
and the WAEMU Common External Tariff (TEC) instituted in 2001 which greatly simplified and 
reduced import taxation.  These reforms and liberalization measures spurred imports but largely 
failed to catalyze the hoped-for export and foreign investment boom. Instead, many of the 
inefficient incumbent firms collapsed, replaced by the mushrooming informal sector rather than 
formal domestic and foreign firms.  Smuggling continued unabated. The underlying problem was 
that trade liberalization in the context of an adverse business climate and a clientelistic state is 
insufficient and perhaps even counterproductive.  Likewise, export promotion is unlikely to 
succeed in a context of complex and burdensome regulations, favoritism, corruption and 
dysfunctional infrastructure.  Thus, Senegal’s largest industries—groundnuts, fishing and 
textiles—stagnated or collapsed (Golub and Mbaye 2002, Mbaye 2002).  Only those import-
competing sectors that retained high levels of protection—sugar, vegetable oil and flour—
managed to stay afloat, although even the highly subsidized groundnut oil producer SUNEOR 
recently went bankrupt (Mbaye, English and Golub 2016). 
In the 2000s, the governments of Abdoulaye Wade and Macky Sall continued the 
Senegalese tradition of announcing ambitious plans to promote private-sector development and 
transform Senegal into an emerging market.  Wade’s 2005 Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée 
(SGA) targeted industrial “clusters” in sectors such as agriculture, light manufacturing, tourism 
and telecommunications, with little discernible effect.  Meanwhile Senegal continued to rank near 
the bottom of the World Bank Doing Business indicators and other measures of the business 
environment. Most recently the Sall administration has unveiled the Plan Sénégal Emérgent (PSE) 
which, as the name suggests, aims to make Senegal an emerging economy through high and 
inclusive growth, targeting similar sectors as identified by the SGA (English 2016, IMF 2017).  
Unlike some of the previous plans, the PSE is showing some signs of success as Senegal has 
experienced strong growth in 2015-2018.  Perhaps not coincidentally, Senegal’s rank in the Doing 
Business indicators has improved from 178th out of 189 countries in 2013 to 147th in 2016 (English 
2016).  Clearly, however, Senegal has a long way to go to reach the elevated status of emerging 
economy.   
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3 The Labor Market, Youth and Gender Equality 
 Senegal’s weak economic growth combined with unabated population expansion has 
translated into a growing gap between labor supply and demand and thus bleak employment 
prospects, especially for women and young people (Golub, Mbaye and Chwe, 2015).  The 
Senegalese population increased by over 50% over the last 15 years to 15.5 million people in 2016. 
Formal employment opportunities have not kept pace. The growing working age population has 
almost entirely been absorbed into the informal sector, in agriculture and especially in urban areas.  
As a result, living standards and economic prospects for young people are dismal.  As a recent 
Millennium Challenge Corporation report (MCC 2017) points out, for much of the population, the 
situation has barely improved over the last 20 years.  
Employment is thus overwhelmingly in the informal sector in Senegal as in other low-
income African countries (Benjamin and Mbaye, 2012; Golub and Hayat, 2015). For a working 
age population over 8 million and a labor force of about 6 million, there are only about 500,000 
formal sector employees in the public and private sectors receiving regular pay and benefits.  Along 
the same lines, ANSD (2016) reports that over 95% of employers and independent workers are 
informal.   
Also, as in many other Sub-Saharan African countries, the distinction between 
unemployment, discouraged workers and informal-sector employment is hazy in Senegal.  
Employment as a share of the working population in 2015 in Senegal was reported by ANSD 
(2016) at 59% for men and only 32.8% for women. Less than 10% of the labor force is employed 
in the formal sector, over 75% work in the informal sector, and the remaining 15% is unemployed, 
i.e., reported in the labor force and actively looking for work. Official unemployment was higher 
for women (22.6%) than men (9.8%) in 2015.  Measured underemployment, defined as 
involuntarily working part time, is also considerably higher for women than men, at 39% and 20% 
respectively (ANSD 2016).  These official estimates of unemployment and underemployment do 
not count the large number of people working in largely unpaid capacities within households, 
including family members and servants.  
The International Labor Organization (ILO) measure of vulnerable employment provides 
a partial measure of the extent of informality. Vulnerable employment is defined as self-
employment and family workers.  These workers account for the overwhelming share of 
employment in Senegal, although the share of vulnerable employment has declined somewhat over 
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the last two decades from around 90% to 70% for all workers (Figure 2).  For females, the share 
is even higher and has declined less, remaining at about 80% in 2016. 
 
Figure 2: Share of Vulnerable employment, in total employment (%) 
 
Source: ILOStat.   
 
A minority of workers receive a regular salary; the rest are paid by the task or irregularly. 
A further indicator of the extent of informality is that only 20% of employees are paid by check or 
direct deposit. The majority are either paid in cash, in kind, or not remunerated at all (ANSD 2016).  
The share of workers receiving benefits is likewise low.  ANSD (2016) reports that about 15% of 
employees have medical insurance and retirement plans.  Considering that these figures do not 
include people out of the labor force—mostly household workers—the share of the population 
covered by social safety nets is even lower.   
Over the last 30 years, employment creation in the formal private sector has stagnated while 
the public sector has shed jobs. Most recently, improved economic growth in Senegal, led by non-
tradable sectors such as construction, commerce, communications, and information technology, 
has boosted formal employment moderately. However, about 2/3 of these contracts are temporary 
(Golub, Mbaye and Chwe 2015).  In contrast, in 1980, about 60% of employment contracts were 
indefinite (Terrell and Svejnar 1990).  
For women and young people, the labor market situation is especially difficult.  While 
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education. 40% of young people classified as outside the labor market are “discouraged workers” 
who have ceased looking for work due to poor prospects.  Those that do have jobs are 
overwhelmingly in the informal sector (Ministère de la Jeunesse 2014).  
 Although Senegal’s constitution guarantees gender equality, women and girls are 
disproportionally affected by poverty. In 2014, Senegal’s SIGI Index was estimated at 0.1985 
placing the country in the category of medium gender equality; Senegal’s score was 63rd in the 
world and 11th in Sub-Saharan Africa.2 Family code and physical integrity were the areas in which 
Senegal showed the weakest performance. Especially in the rural areas, women experience 
discrimination in the domains of education, inheritance, and gender roles within family. Women 
suffer from domestic violence, genital mutilation, and limited reproductive rights including 
restrictive abortion regulations.3 Women face obstacles in completing their education, possess 
little authority in decisions regarding marriage or land acquisition, face unfair inheritance laws, 
and have little access to formal employment opportunities.4 While many of these issues are deeply 
entrenched in local traditions, they can be combated gradually through women’s economic 
empowerment along with more effective enforcement of laws that protect gender equality. More 
active female economic participation will result in increased financial independence and greater 
political power which will act to reduce the gender gap in Senegal. Women’s empowerment is 
known to start a positive reinforcement cycle of economic development and lead to more rational 
choices regarding family planning and raising the next generation which highlights tremendous 
economic benefits of encouraging women’s employment.  
While the informal sector provides livelihoods of last resort to millions of people, it is 
usually characterized by low incomes, lack of benefits and no security. Earnings of informal sector 
workers average about one quarter of the earnings of public sector employees and one third of 
formal private sector workers (Benjamin and Mbaye, 2012; Golub and Hayat, 2015)5. The 
                                                 
2 OECD Social Institutions and Gender (SIGI), Index Senegal, 2014: 
http://www.genderindex.org/country/senegal/  
3 OHCHR, Women in Senegal: breaking the chains of silence and inequality. 17 April 2015 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15857&LangID=E  
4 Africa for women’s rights. Senegal 
http://www.africa4womensrights.org/public/Dossier_of_Claims/SenegalENG.pdf  
5 In some large informal sector firms, wages are closer but still below those of the formal sector 
(Benjamin and Mbaye 2012). 
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unsatisfactory nature of informal sector employment and continuing gender inequalities highlight 




4 The Product Space Methodology for Identifying Actual and Potential 
Comparative Advantage 
 
An increasing consensus has developed on the importance of export growth and 
diversification for economic development. All exporting of course brings foreign exchange.  
However, some exports are more conducive to structural transformation and equitable growth than 
others.  Natural resource extraction and distribution is capital-intensive with relatively few positive 
spillovers to the rest of the economy.  Manufacturing and agriculture are more subject to 
technological progress, forward and backward linkages with other sectors, and employment 
creation, including for women and youth.  The employment issue is of critical importance in 
countries with young and rapidly growing populations, and empowerment of women is of central 
importance in its own right and as a way of fostering the demographic transition to lower birth 
rates.  It is well known that the East Asian “miracle” was based on export-led growth of labor 
intensive manufacturing.  Export-oriented agriculture, fishing and tourism can also play a 
transformative role for much the same reasons: employment creation and quality upgrading 
through participation in global value chains (Golub, O’Connell and Du, 2008; Golub, Bernhardt 
and Liu, 2011).   
Hausmann and various collaborators (Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik 2007, Haumann and 
Klinger 2007, Hausmann and Hildago 2011) have developed a framework for analysis of exports, 
centered on the concept of economic complexity.  In recent years, they have refined and developed 
empirical methods and data for measuring the quality and potential of exports through The MIT 
Atlas (Hausmann and Hildago et al, 2011), an interactive open platform that enables analysis of 
the composition of international trade for developing countries. It has been applied to many 
developing countries but only to a limited extent in Senegal. 
The theory of economic complexity is based on the notion that products are created with 
knowledge. Each good can be thought of as a manifestation of productive knowledge and capital 
that was used in its creation. These ingredients are known as capabilities; an economy grows by 
creating a network of related capabilities across the workforce, which enables it to produce new 
kinds of goods. The combination of goods produced by an economy contains information about 
this economy’s complexity level and potential industries for expansion. Economic complexity of 
a country essentially refers to the abundance and level of sophistication of its capabilities measured 
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by diversity of its export structure and the ubiquity of the products comprising its exports. Diversity 
of a country’s exports refers to the number of different products the country makes, it can be 
thought of as a vector with entries corresponding to all traded products; an entry assumes the value 
of 1 if the country produces the corresponding product and 0 if it doesn’t. Thus, high diversity 
signals that a country produces a large number of products that implies one of the two following 
scenarios: the country is either economically complex and has a lot of productive capabilities or 
this country has rich natural resource endowment and produces a lot of simple products that don’t 
require complex knowledge and capital. In order to determine which of the scenarios is true for a 
specific country, we need to measure the ubiquity of each product comprising the country’s 
exports. Ubiquity of a product is estimated by the number of countries that produce that product, 
it can be represented by a vector with 1 for entries corresponding to countries that produce this 
product and 0 for entries corresponding to countries that don’t. Low ubiquity of a product can arise 
due to the high capability requirement, like in case of complex machinery, or due to the scarcity 
of inputs, like in the diamond industry. Creating a precise estimate of the number of production 
capabilities available to an economy or required to produce a product involves taking measures of 
one indicator (diversity or ubiquity) and correcting that information using the other indicator. For 
example, to determine economic complexity of a country we must calculate the average ubiquity 
of the products it produces, multiply it by the average diversity of countries that produce each of 
those products, and so on. A country with diverse products that have low ubiquity scores high on 
the Economic Complexity Index (ECI). In 2015, the country with the highest economic 
complexity, Japan, had an ECI score of 2.35 and the country with the lowest complexity, Sudan, 
had an ECI of -1.87. Similarly, to calculate the economic complexity of a product, we much 
measure the diversity of countries that produce the said product, correct that information by the 
ubiquity of all other products that those countries produce, and so forth. A product that has low 
ubiquity that is produced by countries with high diversity scores high on the Product Complexity 
Index (PCI). The most economically complex product of 2015, metalworking machine-tools, had 
a PCI of 2.62 and the least complex product, sesame seeds, received a score of -2.97. 
This system also provides a way to quantify the “distance” to a new product, i.e., the 
similarity between the capabilities that a country already possesses and those that underlie 
production of a product that may present a potential diversification opportunity. This is important 
because it allows us to estimate how easily a country can start producing a new product thereby 
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providing clues about actual and potential comparative advantage. Calculation of distance relies 
on the measure of proximity between products. Proximity between two products refers to the 
similarity of capability requirements between these two goods. While required capabilities cannot 
be measured directly, they can be inferred by the frequency with which two products are produced 
by the same country.  That is, if two products are often produced together, these two products are 
said to have high proximity and thus likely having similar capability requirements. Distance to a 
product P for a country C is defined as the inverse of the sum of proximities between all products 
that country C produces and the product P. Thus, if a country already produces many goods that 
require similar capabilities as the product P, the distance to that product will be small, which means 
that it would be easy for the country to start producing product P since it will only need to obtain 
a few additional capabilities required for production of P. However, if the products a country 
makes have few shared requisite capabilities with the product P and the distance to P is large, it 
would be difficult for the country to diversify into production of P. This logic allows us to identify 
potential diversification routes by considering the products that are close to the ones that a country 
already produces. 
Economic complexity refers to the production characteristics rather than exports.  
Unfortunately, for many developing countries, including Senegal, consistent sectoral production 
data are not available, so researchers had to construct the product space based on international 
trade data. Despite the fact that economies don’t export everything they produce, theory suggests 
that countries export products that they have a comparative advantage in, which makes trade data 
an acceptable approximation for production data.  Furthermore, as noted previously, both theory 
and empirical observation point to the importance of exports in fostering development. 
The product space is a graph consisting of nodes that represent major traded products and 
connections that measure proximity between them (in order to preserve legibility, only the 
strongest 1% of links is shown). For each country, the nodes that represent goods with a Revealed 
Comparative Advantage (RCA) greater or equal to 1 are shaded, while other nodes are left blank. 
This design allows to quickly assess each country’s complexity level: a greater amount of shaded 
nodes and higher concentration of shaded nodes in the well-connected center of the product space 
corresponds to higher levels of economic complexity. Typically, less developed and less 
diversified economies tend to have fewer shaded nodes that are mostly located on the periphery of 
the product space. RCA is defined in equation (1) for home country c and product p.  Xcp are 
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exports of country C of product p. RCAcp > 1 for product p if the country exports a larger amount 
of that product than the amount predicted by its economic size and the product’s share of global 
trade.  
(1)    
While the product space framework and accompanying export data provide a valuable 
resource, there are also several limitations for purposes of assessing the value of a certain product 
for promoting development.   
First, there may be a negative relationship between a product’s complexity and its labor-
intensity. Since the main agenda of this study is identifying diversification opportunities that could 
decrease unemployment among women and youth, the diversification products of greatest 
importance may not coincide with those with high PCI. For this reason, capital-intensive products 
will be excluded from the final recommendation since their development cannot contribute to 
employment creation.  Petroleum refining and chemical products are cases in point as discussed 
further below. 
Secondly, export data can sometimes be misleading if examined in isolation from imports.  
A country can have RCAcp > 1 for product p, yet have a large trade deficit in that product.  In 
particular, in Africa especially, sometimes countries re-export goods they imported from abroad 
with minimal value added.   Thus, we also exclude products whose import value is equal or greater 
than their export value from our analysis.  Petroleum products could also be excluded on this 




5 Senegal’s International Trade: Macro Trends 
Senegal’s exports have grown much more slowly than global trade or even African trade.  
Figure 3a shows that Senegal’s share of global exports has dropped precipitously since the early 
1960s from about 0.15% to 0.01% in the 2000s, then edging up in the last few years to close to 
0.02%.  Senegal’s share of African exports also plummeted from about 3% to 0.5% between 1962 
and 2014 despite the fact that Africa’s share of world exports itself fell by about half over this 
period (Figure 3b). 
 
Figure 3. Senegal’s Dwindling Share of World Exports 
a. Senegal’s Share of World Exports (Percent) 
 
b. Senegal’s Share of Total African Exports (Percent) 
 
































































































































A further manifestation of Senegal’s lack of competitiveness is its ever-widening trade 
deficit.   Senegal’s imports have steadily surged ahead of exports leading to sustained trade deficits 
funded by inflows of foreign aid, remittances and official loans (Figure 4).   
 
Figure 4. Senegal’s Exports, Imports and Trade Balance ($ Millions) 
 
Source: MIT Atlas 
 
Another concern arises from Senegal’s declining complexity index (ECI) since the 1960s 
(Figure 5). Senegal’s ECI level fell between 1980 and 2000 and then recovered somewhat over the 
last 15 years. Senegal has steadily dropped in the ECI country ranking over this time, as other 

















Figure 5. Senegal’s Economic Complexity Index (ECI) Score and Rank over Time 
 
Source: MIT Atlas 
  
 
Senegal’s manufacturing exports have risen over time as a share of total but the 
preponderance of manufactured exports consists of chemicals related to phosphates and cement, 
two capital-intensive sectors (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Senegal: Total and Main Manufactures Exports (% of Total Exports) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UN Comtrade data. 
 
Exports of the most basic labor-intensive manufacturing such as textiles, clothing and 
shoes, however, have declined sharply over time (Figure 7).  Textile exports were fairly substantial 
in the first few decades after Independence but dropped sharply since the late 1980s.  Leather 







































































Figure 7. Senegal: Exports of Labor-Intensive Manufactured Exports (% of Total Exports) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UN Comtrade data. 
 
As a share of world exports, Senegal’s exports of manufactured exports are even less 
impressive (Figure 8), dropping steadily in the 1960s and 1970s to very low levels with a small 
recovery since 2000 due mainly to exports of chemicals, as seen in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 8.  Senegal’s Manufactured Exports (% Share of World Manufactured Exports) 
 




















































































































Overall, Senegal’s export performance has been quite disappointing and more dynamism 
is necessary if the country is to succeed in its goal of reaching emerging economy status. This 
finding is not novel and was pointed out in our earlier work (Golub and Mbaye 2002, Mbaye and 
Golub 2003) as well as others (English 2016, IMF 2017).  In this paper, we hope to advance the 
literature through the use of the product-space methodology described above, which to our 
knowledge has not until now been systematically applied to Senegal. This approach allows for a 
comprehensive perspective on export possibilities and sets the stage for evaluating the potential of 




6 Product Space Analysis of Senegal’s Exports 
6.1 Evolution of Senegal’s Comparative Advantage 
This section focuses on evaluating Senegal’s main export sectors and identifying potential 
export opportunities based on their proximity to the already established industries and their 
potential for female and youth employment. Our analysis of current export composition as well as 
its development over time will enable us to ascertain the most promising industries.  The data are 
all from the MIT Product Space Atlas, and uses the framework described in section 4.   
Figure 9 displays Senegal’s product space.  Colored dots indicate Senegal’s exporting 
industries.  Lines connecting the dots indicate industries that are “close” and therefore of possible 
consideration as diversification options, using the above described definition of proximity.  
In the 1960s, Senegalese exports were dominated by groundnut products including peanut 
oil, edible peanuts, and oilcake (Figure 10).  At that time, Senegal was one of the world’s largest 
exporters of peanut oil. This sector remained important throughout the next 50 years, but has 
experienced many difficulties and currently is facing an existential crisis, as discussed more fully 
below. Senegal also displayed potential in other primary products that, despite their low 
complexity index, play a central role in many developing countries’ economies. Among these 
products were cocoa beans, coffee, and diamonds. However, by the mid-1960s many of these 






Figure 9. Senegal’s product space, 2014 
 
Source: MIT Atlas 
 
Figure 10. Senegalese export composition in 1966 
 
Source: MIT Atlas 
 
In the 1980s, fishing experienced rapid growth in Senegal. By the early 1990s, fishing 
became the single most important export sector and continued to constitute 40-50% of all exports 
until the early 2000s (figure 11). During this time, peanut products, cotton, phosphates, fertilizer, 





Figure 11. Senegalese export composition in 1993 
 
Source: MIT Atlas 
 
In the mid-2000s the role of fish and other seafood exports became significantly less 
pronounced as other industries started to exhibit rapid growth and overfishing became an 
increasing problem, as discussed below. Though fish, chemicals, and peanut products remained 
important exports, we can observe a considerable expansion of processed food, cotton, tobacco, 
cement, and gold.  
In the last decade, Senegal was able to further diversify its exports (figure 12). In addition 
to fish and chemicals, it now exports gold, cement, hides, tobacco products, cotton, and various 
foods including nuts, legumes, vegetables, and food products. Meanwhile, Senegal continues to 
import a wide range of goods including machinery, electronics, fabrics and clothing, medicaments, 





Figure 12. Current export composition (2014) 
 
Source: MIT Atlas 
6.2 Senegal’s Product Space and Diversification Opportunities 
Our objective is to discern promising export diversification opportunities in Senegal with 
a view to boosting employment, particularly of women and youth.  Thus, the sectors in question 
must not only have strong potential comparative advantage but must also be labor-intensive.  For 
a labor-abundant country such as Senegal, comparative advantage and labor-intensity ought to 
coincide but in practice often does not, as we will see. 
About 150 products with RCA>1 appear in the product space for Senegal, with some 
variations depending on whether the SITC or HS system of classifying goods is used.  These are 
listed in Appendix 1 for the HS classification.  The largest of these, accounting for at least 0.5% 
of exports, are shown in Table 1.  Table 1 shows the product category, the name of the product, 
the value of exports and imports in millions of US dollars, the product’s share of total Senegalese 
exports, and Senegal’s Revealed Comparative Advantage in that product (RCA).     
A large number of the products displayed in Table 1 and Appendix 1 manifestly do not 
satisfy the objective of boosting employment for two main reasons mentioned earlier 1) A number 
of these products are not actually produced in Senegal or involve minimal domestic value added.  
That is because the exports include re-exports—products imported into Senegal that are then 
transshipped to other countries in the region, notably the land-locked countries to the North of 
Senegal, with little domestic processing.  2) Some products are capital-intensive and thus not likely 
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to generate significant employment even if they do grow. Some products are both capital-intensive 
and re-exported.    
If the import value of a product is greater than its export value there is a large possibility 
that Senegal acts merely as a middleman between this product’s origin and its final destination. 
Table 2 provides some examples of goods that are likely re-exported at least in part.  These re-
exported sectors don’t represent available domestic capabilities, contribute meaningfully to the 
complexity measure or provide potential for employment.   
Refined petroleum is Senegal’s largest export by far, constitution 14% of exports in 2015.  
Yet Senegal imports far more refined petroleum products than it exports, reflecting re-exports to 
other Sahelian West African countries, especially Mali.  Senegal does have some domestic 
refineries but the large volume of imports suggests that the large positive RCA is misleading.  Rice 
is produced domestically and exported but imports are far larger than exports.  The exports of these 
products must reflect re-exports.  In general, while the product space provides a start at ascertaining 
potential comparative advantage and prospects suitable for promoting in structural transformation, 
the list of sectors to be considered also requires judgment based on knowledge of the economy. 
Furthermore, a surprisingly large number of products that Senegal exports are capital-
intensive and not good prospects for raising employment of youth and women (Table 3). Senegal’s 
largest export in value, refined petroleum is not only re-exported but is also very capital-intensive.  
Cement constitutes more than 6% of Senegalese exports but cement production is capital-intensive 
and employs few women. Other capital-intensive or natural resource intensive products such as 
gold, mineral products, and phosphoric acid create relatively few employment opportunities and 
provide little indication of the country’s underlying capabilities.  
Given the prevalence of re-exports, capital-intensive and natural-resource-intensive 
products in Senegal, the standard product-space calculation of distance is not very meaningful. 
Senegal is obviously a labor-abundant country with fairly limited natural resource endowments.  
The fact that many of its exports are capital and natural-resource intensive reflects the failure to 
develop globally competitive manufacturing and agricultural sectors, not intrinsic features of the 
economy.  We therefore attempt to address export diversification and employment creation 
through a more visual and intuitive approach to the product space than those of other recent studies 




Table 1. Senegal’s Largest Exports: Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA), Export and 
Import Value (in Million US dollars) and Export Share (share of total exports in %)  
  RCA 
Export 
share Exports Imports 
Net 
exports 
Refined Petroleum 4.0 14.2% 390.4 787.2 -396.8 
Gold 5.3 9.3% 255.3 0.9 254.5 
Non-fillet Frozen Fish 69.0 8.3% 229.2 7.3 221.9 
Cement 90.2 6.4% 176.8 6.1 170.7 
Phosphoric Acid 212.1 6.4% 175.8 0.5 175.3 
Soups and Broths 178.9 3.5% 97.6 8.1 89.5 
Molluscs 33.3 2.6% 72.0 0.3 71.7 
Calcium Phosphates 108.9 2.4% 66.9 0.0 66.9 
Ground Nut Oil 934.1 2.3% 63.8 0.3 63.6 
Ground Nuts 102.7 1.7% 45.8 0.0 45.8 
Rolled Tobacco 11.0 1.6% 43.7 1.2 42.5 
Titanium Ore 128.3 1.5% 40.8 0.0 40.8 
Crustaceans 9.6 1.5% 40.5 0.1 40.4 
Niobium, Tantalum, etc. Ores 188.4 1.5% 39.9 0.0 39.9 
Fake Hair 50.5 1.4% 39.4 13.1 26.4 
Non-fillet Fresh Fish 13.4 1.4% 38.9 0.1 38.8 
Rice 9.4 1.4% 37.9 414.5 -376.6 
Malt Extract 10.5 1.2% 33.5 117.1 -83.6 
Raw Tobacco 14.7 1.2% 33.1 54.0 -20.9 
Tropical Nuts (Cashews etc) 23.6 1.1% 30.5 0.8 29.7 
Beauty Products 4.5 1.0% 28.3 12.2 16.1 
Legumes 98.8 0.9% 25.1 0.1 25.1 
Salt 48.2 0.9% 24.1 2.5 21.7 
Fish Fillets 6.5 0.9% 23.6 0.1 23.6 
Tomatoes 15.2 0.8% 23.3 0.6 22.7 
Scrap Iron 4.6 0.8% 22.7 0.1 22.6 
Tropical Fruits 12.0 0.8% 21.0 2.3 18.7 
Scrap Copper 5.3 0.6% 17.5 0.0 17.5 
Special Purpose Ships 3.1 0.6% 17.4 0.3 17.0 
Melons 27.8 0.6% 16.3 0.0 16.3 
Other Vegetables 6.9 0.6% 16.3 0.5 15.8 
Processed Fish 5.6 0.5% 14.8 1.1 13.7 
Raw Cotton 7.3 0.5% 14.4 1.5 12.9 
Other Oily Seeds 18.6 0.5% 13.4 4.4 9.0 





Table 2. Products Where Senegal’s Imports Exceed Exports, Likely Reflecting Re-exports, 
2014 (Exports and Imports in Million US Dollars)  
  RCA Export share Exports Imports Net exports 
Refined Petroleum 4.0 14.2% 390.4 787.2 -396.8 
Rice 9.4 1.4% 37.9 414.5 -376.6 
Raw Iron Bars 4.3 0.4% 11.3 25.3 -14.0 
Concentrated Milk 3.4 0.4% 11.1 47.3 -36.2 
Plastic Lids 1.2 0.4% 10.4 34.5 -24.2 
Palm Oil 1.9 0.3% 9.5 90.9 -81.3 
Source: MIT Atlas 
 
Table 3. Senegal Capital- or Natural Resource-Intensive Export Sectors (Exports in Million 
US Dollars)  
  RCA Export share Exports 
Refined Petroleum 4.0 14.2% 390.4 
Gold 5.3 9.3% 255.3 
Cement 90.2 6.4% 176.8 
Phosphoric Acid 212.1 6.4% 175.8 
Calcium Phosphates 108.9 2.4% 66.9 
Titanium Ore 128.3 1.5% 40.8 
Niobium, Tantalum, etc Ores 188.4 1.5% 39.9 
Raw Iron Bars 4.3 0.4% 11.3 
Mixed Mineral or Chemical Fertilizers 1.9 0.3% 8.1 
Copper Wire 2.6 0.3% 7.7 
Cold-Rolled Iron 2.87 0.3% 40.5 
Source: MIT Atlas 
 
Recently, Hausmann and his colleagues have adopted increasingly sophisticated methods 
of determining diversification opportunities using algorithms to find those products that do not 
currently display comparative advantage (RCA < 1), referred to as “Non-RCA products” but are 
both “close” to currently exported products and more complex than existing exports (Hausmann 
& Chauvin, 2015; Hausmann, Cunningham, Matovu, Osire & Wyett, 2014).  The method is 
illustrated in Figure 13 for Senegal with a scatter plot of all 4-digit HS products non-RCA products 
(over 1000 products) with the product complexity (PCI) on the vertical axis and Senegal’s 
“distance” to that product on the horizontal axis.  The products deemed most promising are those 
in the upper left quadrant, i.e., those with PCI above the median for Senegal’s Non-RCA products 
and those with below-median closeness to Senegal’s RCA products (those with lower distance).  
The idea is to find products that would raise the complexity of Senegal’s exports and at the same 
time are more feasible to produce as evidenced by their lower distance.  To further narrow the 
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feasible range of products under consideration, it is possible to eliminate those products for which 
world trade is growing more slowly than average and those with low “opportunity gain”.  The 
opportunity gain index quantifies the contribution of a new non-RCA product in terms of its 
connectedness to more complex products. Intuitively, this means that the capabilities embedded in 
this product are proximate to the required capabilities of a number of other more complex products.  
This is similar to distance but takes into consideration product complexity as well. 
While this methodology is quite ingenious and may work well for countries with relatively 
advanced economies and diversified exports, we have come to the conclusion that such a 
mechanical procedure for identifying export opportunities is not practical or sensible for low-
income countries like Senegal because the product-space concept of distance is likely to be 
misleading.  Figure 14 illustrates the reasons why.  It shows both Senegal’s RCA and non-RCA 
products in 2015 in a scatterplot of PCI and distance as for Figure 13. In addition, the magnitude 
of exports for each product are displayed by the size of the bubble, with bubbles colored in blue 
being RCA products and those in grey non-RCA products6.  The five largest of Senegal’s 2015 
exports are labelled in Figure 14, consisting of Refined Petroleum, Gold, Phosphoric Acid, Cement 
and Fish.  Together these five products account for about half of Senegal’s exports.  Thus, 
“closeness” to these five products will strongly influence the distance variable for Senegal.  The 
underlying premise of the product space methodology is that actual exports reflect capabilities and 
products which are less “distant” from existing exports are thus more feasible. These five products, 
however, would not provide a very good measure of capabilities for reasons noted above.  First of 
all, several of them reflect natural resource endowments: gold, phosphoric acid (based on 
phosphate mining) and fish.  While it could be argued that fishing involves skills and is very labor-
intensive, extractive industries in general are capital- and natural resource-intensive and thus do 
not reflect the human and technological capabilities of the Senegalese workforce.  Cement and 
petroleum refining are also very capital intensive and thus unlikely to meaningfully indicate paths 
to labor-intensive exports.  Second, petroleum refining, like a number of other Senegalese exports, 
is in fact imported in much greater volumes than exports, and thus may largely be re-exported 
rather than produced domestically.  While Senegal does indeed refine some petroleum products, 
the fact that imports are much larger than exports is hardly suggestive of comparative advantage.  
                                                 
6 Grey bubbles can be quite large, reflecting sizeable exports for Senegal yet have RCA<1, i.e., Senegal’s 
exports of that product, while fairly large, are below average as a ratio of world exports.  
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It is therefore highly questionable whether the measures of distance as calculated using the 
Hausmann & Chauvin (2015) and Hausmann, Cunningham, Matovu, Osire & Wyett (2014) 
method is meaningful for Senegal. 
Furthermore, the “frontier” products” generated using the Hausmann & Chauvin (2015) 
method lack plausibility and coherence, both for agricultural products and manufacturing.  Figures 
15 and 16 show the non-RCA products for manufacturing and agriculture respectively identified 
by the Hausmann & Chauvin 2015 method. Table 4 displays the non-RCA sectors with the highest 
average of PCI, density (inverse of distance) and opportunity gain.  The sectors identified in this 
manner lack any clear economic logic or intuitive appeal.  There are a number of metal and 
machinery sectors identified, which makes little sense for a very low-income income like Senegal.  
Agriculture is a more plausible avenue for export diversification but many the agricultural sectors 
identified with the Hausmann & Chauvin (2015) method are also of dubious feasibility for Senegal.  
The highest ranked agricultural category in Table 4 is pigs, which makes no sense at all since 
Senegal is an overwhelmingly Muslim country and very few if any pigs are raised there.  In 
addition, many of the other agricultural products that are identified are animal products requiring 





















Table 4.  Non-RCA Sectors with the Highest Composite PCI, Opportunity Gain and Density 
  PCI Opp. Gain Density Composite 
Packaged Medicaments 2.90 1.18 1.17 1.75 
Cellulose Fibers Paper 2.83 1.25 1.16 1.75 
Other Iron Products 2.83 1.14 1.16 1.71 
Newspapers 2.56 1.08 1.16 1.60 
Nonaqueous Paints 2.46 1.12 1.18 1.59 
Electrical Insulators 2.43 1.00 1.16 1.53 
Other Printed Material 2.33 1.06 1.18 1.52 
Recreational Boats 2.37 1.01 1.17 1.51 
Trailers 2.36 0.96 1.17 1.50 
Explosive Ammunition 2.33 0.92 1.16 1.47 
Other Aluminium Products 2.29 0.95 1.17 1.47 
Insulating Glass 2.34 0.87 1.17 1.46 
Refractory Cements 2.12 1.05 1.16 1.44 
Particle Board 2.32 0.82 1.18 1.44 
Iron Powder 2.23 0.92 1.17 1.44 
Large Aluminium Containers 2.09 1.06 1.17 1.44 
Aluminium Pipe Fittings 2.15 0.92 1.16 1.41 
Soil Preparation Machinery 2.12 0.93 1.17 1.41 
Rubber Belting 2.09 0.88 1.18 1.38 
Utility Meters 2.09 0.86 1.17 1.37 
Other Cast Iron Products 2.07 0.85 1.18 1.37 
Raw Plastic Sheeting 2.02 0.90 1.18 1.37 
Plastic Building Materials 2.08 0.81 1.19 1.36 
Glaziers Putty 1.99 0.90 1.18 1.35 
Steam Boilers 2.01 0.82 1.16 1.33 
Aluminium Pipes 1.89 0.92 1.17 1.33 
Boiler Plants 2.08 0.71 1.16 1.32 
Shaving Products 1.85 0.91 1.17 1.31 
Other Plastic Sheetings 1.88 0.87 1.19 1.31 
Stone Processing Machines 1.93 0.82 1.17 1.31 
Pyrophoric Alloys 1.81 0.92 1.17 1.30 
Safes 1.99 0.73 1.17 1.29 
Aluminium Cans 1.87 0.79 1.19 1.29 
Bandages 1.81 0.83 1.18 1.28 
Pigs 1.94 0.73 1.16 1.28 






We also should keep in mind that some products that are not currently exported may also 
have promise.  In some cases, these may be “close” to existing exports; for example, production 
of fruit and vegetable juices are a natural progression from raw fruit cultivation.  The product space 
analysis can help uncover some such “emerging champions”.  In other cases, though, labor-
intensive products that are only produced at a very low level and not picked up by the product 
space could perhaps thrive if the business climate were improved.  The textile-apparel sector is a 
case in point of such a “marginal” product, as discussed in our previous work (Golub and Mbaye 
2002; Golub, Ceglowski, Mbaye and Prasad 2018).  
6.3 Discerning Sectors with Potential for Boosting Employment  
 Instead of the Hausman and Chauvin (2015) approach we therefore revert to an alternative 
implementation of the product space concepts to determine promising sectors for export 
diversification and employment creation, adopted at the World Bank, e.g. for Ghana (Chandra and 
Osorio-Rodarte 2007) and Benin (World Bank 2009, Chapter 3).  This approach is simpler and 
involves a more intituitive and visual approach to the product space.  We begin by allocating 
industries into four categories: classics, emerging champions, disappearances, and marginal 
exports.   Classics are products that have been exported with a significant RCA and volume for 
extended period of time. The majority of Senegal’s classics possess low complexity indexes but 
provide substantial employment opportunities. For most of its economic history, a few classics—
peanut oil, fishing and phosphates—occupied an overwhelmingly large share of Senegalese 
exports; recently, however they became less dominant not so much because other sectors have 
emerged as their own severe problems (Golub and Mbaye 2002).  Emerging champions include 
export products that only recently gained a significant RCA and are showing promise for further 
growth. Although they have significant potential, their share is typically quite small. In Senegal’s 
case, emerging champions represent attractive opportunities in terms of both employment and 
wealth-enhancing increase in complexity. A few emerging champions are too capital-intensive to 
create the desired employment opportunities for youth and women but have other benefits for the 
economy. Our goal is to examine the effects that an increase of share of emerging champions 
exports would have in the economy and determine what constraints these industries face. 
Disappearances are products whose RCAs decreased significantly over time. In regard to these 
products we must consider why Senegal lost its comparative advantage in them and whether or not 
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it would be possible and useful to revive these industries. Marginal exports include export 
industries in which Senegal never developed a strong comparative advantage. In some of these 
products, Senegal has a potential to eventually establish a comparative advantage, however, in 
others Senegal is not likely to become competitive. Our goal is to determine which ones of these 
industries are compatible with the Senegalese economic structure and identify the obstacles that 
so far have prevented Senegal from obtaining a comparative advantage in these areas.   The 
textile/apparel industry is the most important of these, given the seeming potential advantages that 
Senegal has in this sector (Golub and Mbaye 2002).   The resulting list of sectors are shown in 
Table 5.   
In the remainder of this section we comment briefly on some of these sectors. We focus 
mostly on classics and emerging champions.  We ignore disappearances as these do not have much 
potential.   
 
Table 5 Senegalese classics, emerging champions, disappearances, and marginal exports. 
  Products  Estimated PCI Estimated RCA 
Classics 
Fish and seafood -1.5 28.3 
Groundnuts -2.0 26.5 
Peanut oil -1.9 678.0 
Phosphates and Chemicals 0.0 3.7 
Emerging Champions 
Food Preparations -3.9 187.0 
Hides and Leather -1.8 30.9 
Horticulture -1.7 7.0 
Tobacco products 50.5 31.8 
Synthetic Hair -2.4 71.2 
Gold -2.3 6.8 
Salt -1.1 40.0 
Cement -1.1 83.2 
Disappearances 
Cocoa beans -2.9 0.0 
Tea -2.1 4.4 
Coffee -1.9 0.0 
Marginal exports Cotton -2.4 8.5 
Textiles, Apparel -0.8 128.7 




Table 6 lists the three main “classics”—longstanding and substantial exports—fishing, 
groundnuts, and phosphates.   For each product, the main current exports are shown in the second 
column. The third column shows possible diversification avenues.  The goods listed in bold are 
those that emerge from product-space links.  The others are ones that strike us as plausible but are 
not revealed by the product space network.   
 
Table 6.  Diversification Options for Classics 
Sector Main existing exports Export share Diversification opportunities 
Fish and 
seafood 
Frozen Fish, Molluscs, 
Fresh Fish, Crustaceans, 
Fish Fillets 
15.4% Fish oil, Netting, Pepper, Salt, 
Foliage, Animal pellets, Other 
Inedible animal products, Canned fish 
Groundnut 
Products 
Peanut oil, groundnut 
meal, ground nuts 
2.0% Rice, Tea, Raw cotton, (Locust beans, 
Seaweed, Sugar Beet, Cane), Peanut 
butter 
Chemicals Phosphates and 
fertilizers 
6.2% Vegetable residues, whey, sunflower 
seeds, Generic drugs 
Source: MIT Atlas and author’s analysis. 
Note: Industries in bold are from the product space, others based on logical plausibility. 
 
Fishing  
 We can see that Senegal’s product space is well connected in the area that represents the 





Figure 17 Fishing in Senegal’s Product Space is Well Connected 
 
Source: MIT Atlas 
 
Fishing has only a few primary connections to other goods in which Senegal doesn’t 
already have a comparative advantage. They include netting, live fish (secondary connection), 
pepper, and a few others. Dealing with the serious problems confronting existing fishing sectors 
is probably more promising than pursuing these connected sectors., as will be discussed in the 
section 7 below. 
 
Groundnut products  
 
Senegal has historically been one of the world’s top producer of groundnut oil and 
groundnut meal. Groundnut oil is often thought of as Senegal’s signature product. From 1960 to 
1980, peanut oil alone constituted 20-30% of exports. The value of peanut oil exports during the 
1960s ranged between 40 and 50 million US dollars, which is approximately equal to the present 
export value. In the late 1970s, peanut oil export value jumped to almost 200 million dollars 
making this product the pillar of Senegalese economy. Sluggish economic growth during the next 
20 years revealed the limits of peanut oil as a basis for Senegal’s economy. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
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the export value of peanut oil sharply fluctuated between 40 and 110 million dollars. Unstable 
market prices and susceptibility to unstable weather destabilized this sector exposing the need to 
diversify away from peanut oil (Golub and Mbaye 2002, Mbaye 2005).  
Figure 18 shows Senegal’s share of the world market in groundnuts and groundnut oil.  
Senegal’s very large but highly variable share of the world market is apparent.  This share shows 
a downward trend in the last decade, however.  Exports of unprocessed groundnuts, on the other 
hand, dropped to almost nothing after 1970 from a large global share in the 1960s. 
 
Figure 18.  Senegal’s Share of World Exports of Groundnuts and Groundnut Oil (%) 
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Figure 19 Groundnut Oil Isolated in Senegal’s Product Space 
 
 
Groundnut meal is a natural byproduct of peanut oil production, mainly utilized as a 
livestock feed. The aggregate value of world exports of groundnut meal also has decreased 
significantly since 1995.   
Oddly groundnut oil, groundnut meal and raw groundnuts are not connected in the product 
space—they are each in very different locations with no nodes in common (Figure 19).  This 
observation casts some doubt on the relevance of the product space data for this product for 
Senegal.    
 
Phosphates and other chemicals 
 
 Originated in 1940s, chemical production played an important role in Senegalese economic 
growth. Senegal has vast reserves of extremely high-quality phosphate rock that can be used to 
obtain phosphoric acid - Senegal’s main chemical export. Phosphoric acid is often used to produce 
phosphate salts for fertilizers and dental cements. Phosphate production provides some 
opportunities for income-enhancing diversification but doesn’t seem to create employment for 
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women and youth. Phosphate ore is buried 30-40 meters deep underground and the mining process 
requires sophisticated machinery and little labor. Production of phosphoric acid itself is also 
capital-intensive. Phosphates offer a number of income-enhancing diversification avenues 
including fertilizers, dental products, and other chemicals but, these sectors provide few 
employment opportunities in general, and even fewer for women.  Connected industries do not 
seem particularly promising for growth and employment creation either. 
6.5 Emerging Champions 
Table 7, analogously to Table 6, shows newly emerging industries, i.e., ones which only 
recently have displayed strong comparative advantage.  We briefly discuss here and will pursue 
the most important ones in more detail in section 7. 
 
Table 7 Emerging Champion Sectors 
Sector Main existing exports Export 
share 
Diversification opportunities 
Hides Sheep, goat, equine, 
and bovine hides 
(tanned and untanned) 
1% Gold, Sheep and goats, other nuts, paper 





Tropical Fruit, Cereal 
Flours, Wheat Flours, 
Cassava, Frozen 
Vegetables 
6.7% soap, cement, bran, packing bags, non-
knit undergarments, cocoa beans, 
basketwork, fruit juice, plastic sheeting, 
bananas, cabbages, live plants, 
cucumbers, dried vegetables, grapes, 
flavored water, Food manufacturing 
Tobacco 
products 
Rolled and processed 
tobacco 
3.5% Baked goods, Flavored water, paper 
containers, concentrated milk 
Source: MIT Atlas and authors’ analysis 
Note: Industries in bold are from the product space, others based on logical plausibility. 
 
Horticulture and Food Products 
 
 Senegal has an outstanding potential to develop a strong fresh fruit and vegetable exporting 
sector but despite gradual progress exports remain small (English 2016). Figure 20 shows that 
41 
 
Senegal produces a number of products connected to vegetables and tropical fruit but in low 
quantities and some notable nodes such as fruit juice are empty.  
 
Figure 20 Fruit and Vegetables in Senegal’s Product Space: More Connected but Still Small 
 
 Expanding further from the traditional cotton and groundnuts to more high-yield 
horticultural crops will accelerate the growth of Senegalese economy. The country can rely on its 
good reputation as an exporter of high-quality produce to establish trade partnerships for the new 
sorts of fruit and vegetables that Senegal might diversify into. Some of the most promising 
diversification products include onions, potatoes, bananas, and mangoes. The atlas also indicates 
legumes, melons, tomatoes (UN, 2010).  
 
Hides 
Sheep are the most common livestock in Senegal. While their meat is usually consumed 
domestically, hides have made their way to the international market. In the recent years, RCA of 
sheep hides has increased dramatically making this product one of the most potent emerging 
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champions. While PCI of hides is rather low, this industry has a potential to create employment 
for women and youth. Labor is required at all stages of hides production, especially for processing 
and tanning which tends to primarily employ women.  
 
Other Emerging Champions 
 
 Some of the remaining emerging champions have the potential to accelerate growth of 
Senegalese economy and contribute to accumulation of resources that could be used to strengthen 
infrastructure. However, many of these sectors are capital-intensive and their development is 
unlikely to result in significant reduction of female and youth unemployment. Among the most 
prominent ones are tobacco industries that involve importing raw tobacco and exporting rolled 
cigarettes, gold mining, other mining and cement production. Mining is usually capital-intensive 
but there may be some exceptions that we will investigate. Salt and fake hair are likely labor-
intensive and employ women. Senegal has become the largest salt producer in west Africa with 
about one third of total output being produced by small-scale harvesters7.  The fake hair industry 
could be part of an expansion of fashion-related items.   
6.6 An important Marginal:  Textiles and Apparel 
 The textile and clothing sectors have been the starting point for industrialization in many 
countries over the last 200 years. As wages in China increase, opportunities for new exporters are 
improving.  However, a number of emerging Asian economies such as Bangladesh and Cambodia 
are rapidly expanding market share and have further opportunities to do so.  However, the product 
space for textiles is completely dark except for a small green dot for Miscellaneous textile articles 
at the bottom (Figure 21).  But given Senegal’s advantages in the sector and rising cost in Asia, 
this industry is worth further investigation.   
  
                                                 




Figure 21   The Product Space for Textiles and Apparel in Senegal is Almost Empty 





7 Results of Field Research 
We conducted interviews and conducted literature searches in several sectors identified by 
the product space analysis in the previous section.  The authors have previously investigated these 
sectors and we use of our prior knowledge, other recent literature and interviews. 
7.1 Fishing 
The region’s favorable natural conditions provided Senegal with some of the richest fishing 
grounds in the world. Fishing accounts for about 15% of Senegal’s exports. Fishing’s share of total 
exports sharply declined since the late 1990s when fishing occupied almost half of all exports. 
Sharp differences between yearly export values reveal the susceptibility of the industry to external 
factors such as weather conditions, depletion of fishing stocks, unstable fish prices, and foreign 
competition. 
 The fishing industry plays a central socio-economic role in Senegal. Being highly labor-
intensive, it generates a significant share of employment opportunities for the population (Golub 
and Mbaye 2002, Mbaye 2002). These jobs include fish processing and distribution that primarily 
employs women. In addition, fish is the main source of protein for the Senegalese population. 
In the last 20 years, the fishing industry has been facing an array of challenges created by 
overfishing, foreign competition, climate change, and dysfunctional local institutions. According 
to the UN, more than half of the fisheries around West Africa are dangerously depleted.8 Local 
fishermen believe that foreign industrial boats are responsible for overfishing mackerel and 
grouper, the two local favorites, and destroying the marine habitat. Most scandals related to foreign 
overfishing involve industrial boats from China, Russia, and a few European countries.9 However, 
it is clear that inadequate enforcement of local regulations also contributes to overfishing and 
drives up prices of increasingly rare bigger fish on the local market. Outdated technology and lack 
of information about timing and zones of reproduction result in unsustainable fishing practices and 
deterioration of fish stocks, as in cases when fishermen catch pregnant fish (Golub and Mbaye 
2002). Increased pollution endangers not only the fish population, but also compliance with 
                                                 
8 Source: VOA News. Overfishing leaves the industry in crisis in Senegal. 7 June 2017 
https://www.voanews.com/a/overfishing-leaves-industry-crisis-senegal/3891172.html  





European health standards, which is crucial to get access to export markets. Lack of access to long-
term credit, shortage of qualified managers, and poor infrastructure for artisanal fishing all present 
serious challenges for the industry.  
 In recent decades, fishing stocks and catches have trended downwards, adversely affecting 
fishers’ incomes and food security for the population.  Two main factors are responsible: 
anthropogenic and climatic.  The anthropogenic causes include, among others, the pressures on 
habitats and marine ecosystems (estuaries, deltas, mangroves), industrial pollution at sea (disposal 
of liquid and solid waste, offshore mining and oil wells) and overfishing.  The climatic factors 
involve the warming of the oceans leading to fish movements, loss of marine biodiversity and 
decline of coral reefs (GIEC 2014).  Climate change is particularly threatening to coastal regions 
where the economy revolves around fishing. 
A salient aspect of the fishing industry is the separation into industrial and artisanal 
components.  Within industrial fishing there is a further cleavage between nationally-owned and 
foreign-owned boats and processing facilities. Fish stocks in Senegal can be separated into four 
categories: coastal bottom, coastal surface, deep-sea bottom, deep-sea surface (mainly tuna).    
The problems of the industrial and artisanal sectors are quite different, although there are 
some issues of overlapping interest.  There is much mutual suspicion between these two branches 
of the industry.   
Artisanal and industrial fishing compete to varying degrees for many of these species.   
Artisanal fishing now dominates coastal surface fishing, which consists mainly of smaller fish such 
as sardines, which are not highly sought after in the export market, and are destined mostly for 
local consumption or other African countries.  These fish are processed locally through a highly 
developed semi-formal or informal sector using traditional methods  smoking, salting).  Nearly all 
industrial fishing of sardines has ceased in the face of the competition from the artisanal sector. 
The most intense competition revolves around the highly lucrative coastal bottom species 
such as grouper, yellowfin, mullet, and sole, which are exported, primarily to Europe.   Most of 
the fresh fish exports are caught by artisanal fisherman, and delivered to industrial processing 
factories located around Dakar.  Frozen fish exports mostly originate from the industrial fishing 
fleet equipped with freezing facilities.  Tuna catches are mostly intended for canning.  In recent 
years, however, Abidjan has increasingly been the preferred destination for tuna boats fishing near 




Artisanal fishing in motorized pirogues is a modern extension of the long tradition of 
fishing in Senegal predating the colonial era.  It is generally recognized that Senegalese fisherman 
are highly knowledgeable about their craft and courageous.  Indeed, it is a dangerous profession, 
particularly around Saint Louis due to the rough seas and lack of a breakwater.  Many fishermen 
lose their lives each every year (approximately 50 in the St. Louis area alone).   
The fishing code reserves 6 nautical miles of the coastal zone for traditional fishing.  In 
addition, the government exonerates all equipment purchases from taxes.   
Artisanal account for about 80% of all captures and 60% of exports.  It also involves 
extensive on-shore handling, processing and transporting, which are very labor-intensive.  
Nonetheless, there are many impediments to further progress.  The problem of over-fishing 
discussed below for industrial fishing is also applicable to artisanal fishing, especially in the Petite 
Cote region South of Dakar.   
Credit.  Credit to artisanal fishing is a perennial problem with mutual recriminations from 
bankers, government, and borrowers.   Creditors cite the poor record of repayment while debtors 
point to onerous conditions and the politicization of credit facilities. 
There is a long history of failed government initiatives to provide credit to rural and 
informal producers, including fishing, with new loan programs started, arrears developing, 
followed by debt cancellations.  These repeated debt cancellations have exacerbated the moral 
hazard problem by setting a precedent that credit need not be serviced.   
The main extant government program is associated with the Caisse Nationale de Credit 
Agricole (CNSAS), created in 1984.  The interest rates are viewed as too high by small fisherman.  
Also, the CNSAS requires substantial down payments that are difficult for small fisherman to 
comply with.  The procedures involved in applying for a loan are long and arduous for a small 
business.   
The share of non-performing CNCAS loans to the fishing sector is about 12.5%, high but 
not as bad as in agriculture. This high rate of delinquent loans reflects many of the characteristics 
of informal fishing:  the precarious nature of this trade, lack of training and technical knowledge 
in modern management and accounting, high geographic mobility making tracking of debtors 
difficult, and the attitude among fisherman that credit need not be repaid.  There is also the 
common perception that the CNCAS is not well managed.   
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Private financial markets have not been able to fill the void left by mostly unsuccessful 
government credit programs.  The large commercial banks are not well adapted to making loans 
to small-scale fishing, and do not have the requisite technical expertise in the fishing industry that 
would enable them to screen and monitor risk accurately.  Nor are artisanal fishermen in a position 
to provide the demanding documentation and collateral that banks normally require.  The 
fishermen decry the lack of appropriate credit facilities, while creditors complain about the chronic 
lack of repayment of existing debts.  Interestingly, the women who process the catch are reputed 
to be far more reliable in servicing their debts than the fishermen themselves.    
There have been a number of initiatives to extend credit to artisan fisherman through lines 
of credit placed by donor organizations at the commercial banks.  The main such line of credit is 
the Fond de Promotion Economique (FPE).  The success of the FPE has been mixed at best.    There 
have been several other lines of credit in recent years financed by other donors (Canadians, EU, 
French, World Bank), but the artisanal fishing industry has not benefited much. Networks of 
mutual credit associations may be the best solution to the financing problem of small fishing 
enterprises. 
Infrastructure.  Infrastructural problems tend to be more severe for the artisanal than the 
industrial fishing sector.  While there has been considerable progress, infrastructure deficiencies 
remain in the areas of hygiene and cleanliness as well as other areas.  There are deficiencies in the 
unloading, stocking, and processing of fresh fish: availability of ice and cold storage, water , 
electricity and cleanliness.  In addition transportation of the product is a problem in some locations: 
Petite Cote, Sine Saloum, Casamance.   
 Safety issues.  Fishing is a very dangerous profession. A number of measures should be 
taken to reduce the number of fatalities and loss of production such as encouraging fishermen to 
wear life jackets.  A breakwater is badly needed in St. Louis.    
 Skills and Information.  Although highly skilled in traditional tasks, artisanal fishing 
professionals lack knowledge about modern techniques and norms.  Approximately 90% of 
artisanal fisherman are illiterate.  Cultural attitudes may also sometimes be a problem.  For 
example, fishermen have resisted wearing life vests despite their low cost and the substantial 
number of lives that could be saved.  As another example, the women involved in marketing and 
processing of the catch suffer from lack of organizational and knowledge of modern techniques 





The 1994 devaluation gave a strong boost to the fishing industry, but the boom seems to 
have mostly petered out.  The increased fishing effort may have contributed to the depletion of 
stocks of some species.  Agreements with other countries allow for foreign trawlers to operate in 
Senegal’s exclusive economic zone.  The most important of these is the agreement with the 
European Union.  
Our interviews and documentary research uncovered the followed principal problems.   
Overfishing.  Almost everyone we talked to expressed concerns about overfishing of 
certain species.  A decline in Senegalese fishing yields has been observed in recent years for 
trawling and to a lesser extent for pirogues.  The declining catch combined with the creation of 
new processing firms following the devaluation has entailed problems of excess capacity at many 
industrial fish processing firms.   
The most affected species seem to be coastal bottom fish such as soles, grouper, and 
daurade.  For others such as shrimp, there is no firm evidence of over-fishing, but there is cause 
for concern given the increasing number of shrimp boats.  Coastal surface fish (sardines) do not at 
present show convincing signs of over-fishing, but bear watching because of their importance for 
domestic consumption.  Likewise, some species of tuna seem to be approaching a threshold of 
overexploitation.   
A number of observers note, however, that there is substantial of uncertainty about the 
available estimates, and that more thorough research is needed. Moreover, too little is known about 
the timing and location of zones of reproduction. For example, fishermen catch pregnant female 
octopus, resulting in large reductions in reproduction, although some efforts have recently been 
made to return babies to the ocean.  Most of the professionals we talked to expressed some alarm 
about the problems of overfishing, and stressed the urgency of obtaining more accurate 
information about the conditions of fish stocks and the sustainability of current fishing efforts.   
 There are also regulations about the volume of the catch and restrictions on fishing 
locations based on the size of boats.  But implementation and enforcement are problematic.  The 
industrial fishing organization GAIPES believes that there is substantial evasion of the regulations.  
All domestic and foreign industrial boats must have an official on board to ensure that these 
regulations are respected.  Fishing professionals, however, are skeptical about the effectiveness of 
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these observers. Indeed, the observers are paid, lodged and fed by the operator of the vessel that 
they are observing, seemingly providing perverse incentives for reporting violations.   
 Another source of controversy concerns which groups of fishing fleets are most responsible 
for overfishing and disregard of restrictions.  There is much mutual recrimination between small 
artisan fisherman and industrial fishing, each accusing the other of primary responsibility for 
overfishing.  Among some industrial fisherman, also, there is suspicion that foreign boats take 
more fish than they are entitled to.  
In addition to the problem of overfishing, increasing pollution is a potential threat to both 
the supplies of fish and norms of hygiene.  
Access to Credit. Views are divided about the extent of this problem for the industrial 
fishing sector.  For some firms, this appears to be a secondary issue.  A number of owners  feel 
that if an enterprise is well managed and has transparent and open accounts, banks will provide 
credit, and cite their own experiences to this effect.  However, this credit is mostly short term and 
long-term credit is said to be difficult to get.  While it is true that the fishing fleet is very old, our 
interviews revealed that a number of firms have substantially upgraded their boats, so that the 
common perception of an antiquated fleet is overdone.  
International Norms of Hygiene. Another serious obstacle is the non-conformity to 
international norms of hygiene.  This lack of hygiene is especially linked to the unloading by 
traditional fisherman on beaches, which are also used as garbage dumps.    
The European Union in particular has demanding norms on hygiene.  Recently, major 
investments were undertaken by Senegalese producers to upgrade their facilities to meet EU 
norms.  The EU provided partial financing of these investments.  This was a costly endeavor, with 
many firms unable to cope and going bankrupt, but has been largely completed successfully by the 
remaining exporting enterprises.   
Labor Relations.  Several firms were emphatic about the gravity of the conflicts with 
unions.  The tuna-canning industry in particular has had repeated problems with unions.  Workers 
in industrial fish processing are affiliated with the CNTS (Confederation Nationale des 
Travailleurs Senegalais), which had close ties with the formerly governing Socialist government.  
Thus, the strikes were often at least tacitly supported by the government (interview with U.S. 
embassy).   
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The GAIPES and others cite the high cost of handling at the port, associated with labor 
regulations protecting dockers, as one of the main reason that tuna boats tend to deliver their catch 
to Abidjan rather than Dakar, when they have a choice.  The resistance of unions to improved 
productivity is more of a problem than their wage demands.  The unions particularly target foreign 
ships and enterprises. There is sometimes violence and theft.   
Worker Skills and Training. While Senegal has many skilled traditional fishermen, there 
is a shortage of ship officers with the technical and managerial expertise required in industrial 
fishing.  Thus, a number of boat operators use expatriates for middle management and technical 
posts at considerable additional expense.  These expatriate workers earn much higher salaries than 
Senegalese workers.  Clearly, there would be benefits both to firms and local workers to having 
trained Senegalese personnel who could carry out these tasks.   
There exist several public institutes whose mandate is to train workers for these tasks.  
According to our interviews, these agencies are unable to carry out their functions, in part because 
of budget limitations.    
Physical Infrastructure.  For industrial fishing (as opposed to artisanal fishing), 
infrastructure is mostly adequate.  Roads are of uneven quality, with affects mostly the artisanal 
fishing industry’s ability to move its produce to factories in the Dakar area.  Shipments of fresh 
fish by air, which require care in handling and timeliness, seem to have improved.   
 At the Port of Dakar, the main problem for the tuna boats evoked above seems to be labor 
relations rather than inadequate facilities.    
 Several firms complained about the power outages and the expense of purchasing 
generators.  This contributes to the high cost of electricity in Senegal compared to other countries.    
Corruption and the Judiciary.  A pervasive problem in Senegal has been the politicization 
of business decisions, with government tilting the playing field towards larger firms and those with 
political connections.  There are allegations ship capacity is systematically under-reported by many 
operators, to evade taxes and to obtain more leeway in coastal fishing zones.   
7.2 Groundnuts and Groundnut Products 
Peanuts have been Senegal’s predominant cash crop since the colonial era, and Senegal is 
a major producer of groundnut oil.  As in other African economies, in the first decades after 
independence, control of the cash crop switched from the colonial power to a government-operated 
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marketing board.  In Senegal, the Office National de Coopération et d'Assistance au 
Développement (ONCAD) oversaw all stages of production and distribution in the first decades 
after independence, including providing inputs and credit to smallholder farmers, then purchasing, 
transporting, processing and marketing the output.  Until the middle of the 1970s, groundnuts were 
the mainstay of the Senegalese economy: the sector’s contribution to GDP was about 20%, and it 
accounted for more than 70% of employment and was by far the most important export commodity.   
Towards the end of the 1970s, however, a steady decline set in, in part due to declining rainfall 
and desertification.  Poor management of the sector also played a major role (Golub and Mbaye 
2002). Declining performance and the need for more competition led the government to gradually 
disengage from the sector, culminating in the privatization of SONACOS in 2005.  Unfortunately, 
the reforms failed to improve the industry’s performance: decline in use of fertilizers, distribution 
problems, tensions in access to credit and other basic services to producers etc. All this led to a 
dramatic decrease in production and exports. 
Although the market was partially liberalized in the 1990s, until 2005 the government 
retained a near monopoly on the purchase and processing of groundnuts through the parastatal 
SONACOS, which produced peanut oil and oilcake, primarily for export. The SONACOS was 
heavily involved in the cultivation of the crop, extending credit, distributing seed and fertilizer to 
the peasants, and through its affiliate SONAGRAINES which collected the crop for the 
SONACOS factories.  Farmers increasingly diverted their products to the parallel market.  The 
SONACOS factories had old equipment and suffered from excess capacity (Golub and Mbaye 
2002). The World Bank recommended that it be split up and sold to a couple of investors in order 
to promote competition and avoid the “too big to fail” syndrome.  However, in 2005, after many 
delays, the SONACOS was privatized with the French firm SUNEOR taking over all its assets.  
Recently SUNEOR declared bankruptcy and was renationalized under its old name SONACAS.  
A number of smaller firms still operate in the vegetable oil market, notably NOVASEN.   
SUNEOR was engaged in two separate product lines involving vegetable oils.   First, it 
processed peanuts into peanut oil and a byproduct, oilcake for animal feed, both of which are 
exported, although to different markets.  Second, it imported unrefined vegetable oils, particularly 
soy oil, which it refines and sells on the domestic market, given that these oils are much cheaper 
than peanut oil.  SUNEOR had a refining capacity of 100,000 tons for imported vegetable oil.     
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The organization of the peanut value chain in Senegal is of critical importance for the 
economy and poverty alleviation but has proven very difficult to solve.  As in other cash crop 
systems there is a fundamental tradeoff between competition and coordination, with regard to 
pricing, research and extension, provision of credit and inputs, collection of the crop and payment 
to farmers, as described by Poulton et al (2004) for the cotton industry. Smallholder farming 
requires organization and assistance from either large private firms or the state for input provision 
and quality control that is difficult to reconcile with decentralized competition.  Under the previous 
state-operated marketing boards inputs were typically provided on credit, with the loans being 
repaid through a deduction from the purchase price at the time of collection.  More recently, 
governments have tended to subsidize input purchases by producers.  Clearly, opportunistic 
behavior by farmers as well as input providers is a potential serious threat to the viability of such 
an integrated system.  Until 2005, as noted previously, the parastatal SONACOS played a 
dominant role. The quality of SONACOS’s performance was controversial. Some claim that 
politicization and lack of efficiency characterized the SONACOS but former officers disagree.  It 
was hoped that privatization would improve the situation. In principle a large multinational firm 
with expertise in peanut cultivation and distribution could do this effectively although regulation 
would still be necessary in the absence of competition.  Such a firm has an incentive to assist 
farmers and pay a favorable price to obtain a high-quality crop, particularly if farmers can sell on 
the parallel market.  However, the problems of disorganization and opportunistic behavior have 
continued due to difficulties of contract enforcement and monitoring, and the peanut industry 
remains in crisis.  
One of the major problems confronting groundnut oil production has been obtaining an 
adequate supply of peanuts to crush into oil. Prices were set through negotiations of the 
stakeholders before the season, linked over time to world prices but in the short run stabilizing 
prices to producers. Thus, in some years producer prices exceeded world prices and in some years 
fell below. If market prices are set below world prices or rise after producer prices have been set, 
farmers and traders have a short-run incentive to sell on the parallel market rather than deliver to 
oil processors.  In anticipation of this possibility of opportunistic behavior, oil processors or 
intermediaries may be reluctant to provide credit and inputs to farmers. Binding contracts and 
enforcement of agreements are crucial to limit the collective failure of the system.  In 2011, the 
government liberalized the marketing and purchase of peanuts from farmers, breaking the 
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SUNEOR-NOVASEN control, thus providing more opportunities for competition and options for 
farmers but reducing the scope for sector-wide coordination.  Chinese traders became particularly 
active and purchased at considerably higher prices than the oil processors.  The prices were so 
favorable, in fact, that farmers often neglected to save some of their crop to use as seed in the 
following season.  
A related longstanding problem involves provision of credit and debt repayment.  In the 
current system, the OPS (Operateurs Privés Stockeurs) have been at the center of the difficulties.  
The OPS buy the peanuts from the peasants and resell to the oil producers namely SUNEOR.  But 
the OPS have frequently either defaulted on their obligations to peasants (the “bons impayés”) or 
paid low prices while also failing to deliver the crop to SUNEOR, preferring to sell to the Chinese 
traders who were allegedly importing into Vietnam without paying duties, a practice which has 
now been stopped.  These conflicts involving financing translate into inadequate supply of inputs 
to farmers, resulting in lower yields, and the cycle of underperformance continues into the next 
season.10 
Production of peanut oil varies due to fluctuations in the size of the peanut crop, as well as 
the magnitude of peanuts sold in unprocessed form.  The latter increased sharply in 2012 as 
Chinese buyers entered the market following the 2011 liberalization and purchased at considerably 
higher prices than SUNEOR was offering, with peanut oil production declining accordingly.  As 
seen above in Figure 14, exports or peanut oil have been much larger than exports of peanuts in 
raw form.  Unprocessed peanut sales increased sharply in 2011 and 2012, while peanut oil exports 
collapsed in 2012, coinciding with the rising world prices of peanuts noted above, the liberalization 
of the market, and the entry of new purchasers, mainly Chinese traders.  
Today, peanut oil export value continues to oscillate from year to year, due mainly to erratic 
domestic supply. Though peanut oil has the largest RCA among all Senegalese exports at 500-800 
depending on the data set used, it currently constitutes less than 3% of the total export value. 
Nevertheless, Senegal remains the third largest exporter of peanut oil in the world. Does this mean 
that, with some reforms, the peanut oil industry has a potential to once again become the center of 
Senegalese economy? Should Senegal’s government invest resources into this sector? Given the 
recent dynamic of peanut oil trade, it seems questionable. The growth of groundnut oil exports 
during the last couple of decades has been sluggish comparing to the increase in global trade in 
                                                 
10 See: “Quand L’Arachide Sénégalaise Retrouve un Second Souffle,” Leral.net, Novembre 25, 2012. 
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general and Senegal’s peanut oil processing facilities have been operating at very low capacity 
utilization. Also, it is unclear if the poor management of the peanut oil sector can be reversed.  The 
privatization of the parastatal SONACOS by SUNEOR did not yield the expected improvement 
and SUNEOR was recently renationalized, as noted above (World Bank 2015).   
Groundnut meal is a natural byproduct of peanut oil production, mainly utilized as a 
livestock feed. The aggregate value of world exports of groundnut meal also has decreased 
significantly since 1995.   
Surprisingly, edible (green) groundnuts are now a much more promising export than 
groundnut oil. High quality edible groundnuts can command much higher prices and therefore 
farmer incomes than groundnut oil.  Until the 1970s, Senegal was a major exporter of green 
groundnuts with the export value of the industry over 40 million dollars. In late 1960s scientists 
discovered that, if stored improperly, peanuts may develop mold that contains aflatoxin - a 
poisonous substance known to cause cancer. Senegal, like many other developing countries, didn’t 
have the technology and storage infrastructure to preserve the groundnuts which led to their 
contamination with aflatoxin. As a consequence, Senegalese raw groundnut exports experienced a 
sharp decline in the 1970s. The industry started its recovery in 2010 when Senegal began to export 
groundnuts to China. The current export value is approximately $14 million and, given the 
establishment of modern storage technologies and increased provision of credit, edible groundnuts 
have the potential to provide much needed employment and accelerate growth of the Senegalese 
economy (Mbaye 2005, World Bank 2017).  Box 1 provides details on the issue of sanitary and 




Box 1.  
Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Standards and International Competitiveness in Senegal 
 
For agricultural products, a crucial constraint on exports is the non-compliance with quality 
standards, including sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards (Mbaye, 2009). The Aflatoxin contamination in 
peanuts, and outsized levels of pesticide residues in fruits and vegetables are obstacles to exports of 
Senegal's agricultural products. Unsustainable cropping practices resulting from lack of training and 
information to producers remain common in Senegalese agriculture. According to available data in the 
horticultural sector in the suburban area of Dakar, only 27% of producers are aware of sustainable practices 
in horticultural production (Gueye, 2009). 
 
Groundnuts 
The groundnut subsector includes two major commodities: oil-mill groundnut (peanut oil and 
oilcake) and confectionary groundnut (CG). Groundnut crops are submitted to a process of selection, 
particularly a Hand Picking Selection (HPS), through which the share of output that meets certain criteria 
as regards size and level of aflatoxin contamination, is qualified CG and exported as such. The remainder 
(écarts de tri) is sent for trituration in oil mills.  
Aflatoxin is secreted by a poisonous mushroom called Aspergillus Flavus. Some experiments done 
on animals conclude that it is cancer-producing. Moreover, empirical medical research shows that areas in 
which aflatoxin-contaminated products are most consumed are the ones in which liver cancer is the most 
prevalent.   
Normally, aflatoxin is not contained in unrefined peanut oil, since the toxin completely disappears 
with trituration. However, aflatoxin does contaminate oilcake. This latter is mostly designed for animal 
consumption. It is proven that animals fed with contaminated oilcake can have their milk contaminated by 
a special form of aflatoxin called M1 aflatoxin, which is particularly dangerous for children. There are four 
different types of aflatoxin in peanut oilcake and CG: B1, B2, G1, and G2. The B1 type is deemed the most 
poisonous. To date, there is no technical way to completely eliminate aflatoxin in foodstuffs. In setting 
standards against aflatoxin contamination, the ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principle is 
used.  
Since the early 1980s, SONACOS has developed a technical process using ammonia that reduces 
aflatoxin contamination in peanut oilcake to 10 ppb, far below the 20 ppb accepted in Europe. In contrast, 
Senegalese exports of CG are considerably hampered by product grade and level of contamination. Due to 
the poor quality of seeds used as CG, Senegalese products have problems meeting some basic standards. 
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Aflatoxin develops under certain conditions of temperature and humidity, which are all 
characteristic of CG production areas in Senegal. To avoid contamination, peasants have to adopt certain 
good practices during the production process in the field. Research shows that a production process 
following good practices in CG cultivation results in a final product that has an acceptable low 
contamination rate, with a very high probability. Furthermore, these good practices in the field are the only 
way to control contamination. While managing quality to reduce aflatoxin contamination is within the 
capacity of Senegalese farmers, lack of incentives is making good agricultural practices very difficult to 
implement.  
The reasons for the dramatic decline in CG exports are twofold. First, peasants are not rewarded 
for quality management. Normally, the price of higher quality nuts is superior to the prices of the others; 
but for very long time, farmers have not gotten appropriate seeds for CG. Hence, whatever effort they 
devote to managing quality during the production process are not likely to result in a product that meets 
international CG standards, especially as regards size. Second, agricultural activity is very risky in Senegal 
due to high dependence on rainfall. If a drought occurs (which is quite common), farmers have problems 
servicing their debts.  
 
Fruits and Vegetables 
In Senegal, a study supervised by the Senegalese Agricultural Research Institute (ISRA) and 
another study of Ceres Locustox (CLX) on the issue of pesticide residues on horticultural products in the 
Niayes revealed significant discrepancies between MRLs (Maximum Residue Limit) tolerated and actual 
levels of residues of chemical pesticides found in vegetables grown in the Dakar urban periphery (Les 
Niayes). 
The study of CERES Locustox (2008) revealed the presence of five organophosphorus pesticides 
and 8 organochlorine pesticides on vegetables in the market. Among these they cited pesticides such as 
dieldrin, DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane), aldrin, heptachlor, which are on the list of "the banned 
twelve" of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs). Other commonly used 
pesticides in locust control have also been found on samples analyzing vegetables: ethyl chlorpyrifos, 
malathion and fenitrothion. 
In order to address the SPS challenges facing horticultural exports, beyond mitigating the 
uncontrolled use of pesticides, an appropriate policy of packaging of goods is also needed. Products are in 
general sent abroad without proper packaging; which further deteriorates their quality. Given the highly 
perishable character of these products, we also need a system of storage at the airport level to make sure 
they are not damaged. Such a facility was set up in Dakar airport in 2012, but its limited capacity makes it 
unsuitable for the booming horticultural exports. 
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While these adjustments are needed on the supply side of fruit and vegetable exports, efforts are 
also needed on the demand side. Most importing countries set their SPS standards at very high levels, 
difficult to meet by exporting developing countries. Hence, instead of protecting consumers against health 
hazards, SPS standards are in fact acting as non-tariff barriers. Both sets of countries need to abide by the 
WTO rules to balance consumer protection and enabling export flows from developing to developed 
countries. 
7.3 Horticulture 
Geographical location relatively close to both Europe and America, access to seaports, and 
a favorable climate to grow produce all year around equips Senegal with everything it needs to 
meet the increasing demand for organic fruit and vegetables on western markets. After the CFA 
Franc devaluation in 1994, horticultural production exhibited a substantial improvement 
(UNCTAD 2010). However, the increasing necessity of GlobalGap certification and the 
difficulties of satisfying its demanding quality norms have restricted growth of the sector in the 
early 2000s (Golub and McManus 2008; Mbaye et Gueye 2015). The increased administrative 
barriers to entry to the international market in horticulture lead to the domination of larger 
companies in the sector; the share of small rural farmers dropped from 23 to 10% between 2000 
and 2007. While many small farm owners were unable to withstand the competition of bigger 
companies, consolidation led to reduction of poverty among landless workers who now had more 
opportunities to find employment at the large international conglomerates.  
The devaluation of the CFA franc and the liberalization of agricultural markets in the mid-
1990s stimulated Senegalese horticulture and set it on a path of rapid growth in quantity and in 
quality that continues today. Although fruit and vegetable production (FFV) production remains 
only a fraction of total agricultural output, the sector is expanding even as traditional crop 
production falls. It is dominated by three crops: green beans, cherry tomatoes, and mangoes, and 
the comparatively high yields per hectare on these products are encouraging farmers to 
increasingly substitute away from groundnuts and cotton and into horticulture. An advertising 
campaign by several MNCs promoting a high-quality reputation of Senegalese FFV exports, called 
‘Origine Sénégal’, has also been widely successful and enabled exporters to obtain a premium on 
their products, thereby creating an incentive for additional investment in FFV.  
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A number of substantial, though not insurmountable, constraints impede expansion of the 
sector. Supply-side obstacles are centered about relatively high costs of inputs, due primarily to 
scarcities of skilled labor, arable land, water, and credit. These costs are exacerbated by lack of 
basic infrastructure, namely good roads. Demand-side constraints are also a problem, which 
include stiff international competition (especially from Morocco and Egypt) and adherence to 
quality standards. However, recent R&D provides viable solutions to many of these issues: the 
apparent potential for the expansion of production beyond the Niayes into vast, uncultivated 
regions would alleviate the strain on land and water, the persistent exploitation of off-season 
marketing would bypass much of the international competition, and the progress of exporter 
associations such as ONAPES have already helped and would continue to help many companies 
obtain EurepGAP certification.  Furthermore, the possibility for diversification into potatoes and 
onions and the growing feasability of food processing and packaging also suggest a promising 
future for Senegalese horticulture. 
Moreover, the welfare implications of horticulture production for export in Senegal have 
been recently assessed (Maertens, et al, 2007), and the results are strongly positive.  This outcome 
is surprising in light of the rapid consolidation of the FFV sector into a few multinational firms 
that do not source produce from outgrowers (namely GDS, Sepam, Solial Vert, Baniang, Safina, 
and Agriconcept), a trend that is due to more rigid quality standards, requirements of traceability, 
and consequently a powerful incentive to vertically integrate.  The study finds that in spite of this 
consolidation, and indeed because of it, the returns on horticulture production are more equitably 
distributed, more widespread, and more effective in reducing the incidence of poverty.  In this 
way, the Senegalese government and international donor agencies have an obvious role in 
establishing an attractive environment for FDI by way of upgrading the physical infrastructure, 
improving financial markets, and increasing the availability of skilled labor.  The primary obstacle 
to effective, active support, then, is not the lack of clear goals, but rather the convoluted structure 
of and interactions between existing aid agencies in Senegal. 
 The absence of coordination between public and private organizations may be the foremost 
binding constraint to the development of horticulture in West Africa.  This fragmentation is 
especially critical in Senegal, where the number of alphabet agencies (mostly international) rivals 
that of Ghana.  This is in part due to the presence of several Islamic development institutions that 
generally do not coordinate with other agencies.  It is also in part due to the relative lack of 
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governmental support to FFV, although some recent attempts have been made by the Ministry of 
Agriculture to improve dialogue between organizations.  Perhaps most significantly, there is 
simply no dominant or sufficiently authoritative external organization or private trade association, 
like USAID and UFEA in Uganda, to effectively funnel aid and target project needs. The majority 
of aid (about 75%) is currently invested in ‘hard’ infrastructure, with a large share of the remainder 
being directed toward encouraging environmentally sustainable production techniques. Yet while 
these are certainly important needs, redundancy and incompatible objectives oftentimes renders 
such intervention unproductive. 
Senegal should consider both exporting to neighboring African countries as well as 
growing organic produce for European markets. However, improvements in infrastructure and 
business climate are needed for Senegal’s horticulture to improve international competitiveness. 
Lack of access to credit and difficulties related to obtaining required international certifications, 
along with arid climate and a poor national transportation network are among the greatest 
challenges facing Senegalese horticulture. Development of wind energy, drip irrigation, and better 
roads are essential for success of this sector. Better processing equipment and cold storage are 
needed to allow Senegal to diversify further into frozen and processed vegetables, which could be 
another profitable opportunity. FDI and foreign buyers play a critical role in the distribution of 
horticultural products, so it is essential to improve the general market environment to attract more 
foreign investment. Finally, the government and international donor organizations must work 
together to promote the effectiveness of the above investments and control the environmental 
impact of the sector. 
7.4 Textiles and Clothing 
Global buyer chains dominate the apparel industry, with much labor-intensive 
manufacturing and assembly shifting to developing countries.  A highly sophisticated international 
division of labor has developed, with the most unskilled, labor-intensive operations moving to 
developing countries with very low wages.  As local firms acquire greater experience and 
technological and managerial capabilities, and wages rise, these countries lose the most labor-
intensive operations and upgrade to more sophisticated products.  Through this process, apparel 
production for export has spread to Asia, Latin America and North Africa, beginning with the most 
labor-intensive products, and then gradually shifting to more complex skill-intensive products.  
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Except for Mauritius, however, Sub-Saharan Africa has hardly participated in this globalization of 
manufacturing and of apparel in particular.  Certainly, Senegal has not. 
This is at first surprising since Senegal would seem to have a comparative advantage in 
textiles and clothing given its lack of natural resources, favorable geographical location and 
abundance of informal skilled tailors. Senegal inherited a rather developed textile sector from the 
colonial era.  Until the 1990s, Senegal produced at all stages of the vertical chain, from raw cotton 
to finished clothing.  Senegal had much greater formal production and employment in the more 
capital-intensive textile sub-sectors (spinning, weaving, printing) than in labor-intensive apparel 
assembly.  Virtually all large scale apparel production in Senegal ceased in the 1980s.  By the early 
2000s, the sector was near collapse (Golub and Mbaye 2002). The latter study revealed the textile 
industry’s pervasive inefficiency and lack of capital investment, resulting in obsolete equipment 
and poor management.  15 years later, the situation is even more dire and almost all the firms we 
interviewed in 2002 are gone except for one small clothing distributor, Laay Diaara.  Even Laay 
Diarra has largely ceased production and now imports clothing from Turkey.   
The demise of the industry occurred despite ent provision of seemingly generous 
investment and export incentives in the establishment of one of the first export-processing zones 
(EPZ) in Africa in Dakar in 1974.  The 1994 devaluation had a short-run positive effect on this 
sector, but mostly for the relatively capital-intensive sub-sectors (weaving and spinning) rather 
than the labor-intensive apparel sub-sector.  Golub and Mbaye (2002) chronicle the departure of 
Coultex, a Moroccan-French firm that set up in the EPZ in 1998, after less than a year of operation, 
illustrating the weaknesses in the Senegalese business climate, and the failure to attract or retain 
internationally footloose firms.  Box 2 discusses the failure of the Dakar EPZ.11 
  
                                                 




The Failure of the Dakar Export-Processing Zone: Comparison with Mauritius’s Success 
 The Dakar EPZ was created in 1974, one of the earliest in the world. It has almost completely failed 
to achieve its objectives of boosting employment through foreign investment (Madani, 1999). Much like 
its competitors, the zone offered exemptions from taxes on corporate income, customs duties, and taxes on 
machinery, along with unrestricted repatriation of capital and profits. However, employment in the Dakar 
EPZ reached a high of only 1200 in 1986 and declined further to 600 in 1990. The project was finally 
aborted in 1999 when it hosted only 14 active enterprises with a total of 940 employees. Its failure to spark 
employment growth reflected major deficiencies in the overall business environment, especially labor 
market rigidities, high utility and transportation costs, and cumbersome bureaucratic procedure. The EPZ 
failed to insulate firms from these economy-wide problems.   
The comparison to Mauritius is instructive. The EPZ programs in Senegal and Mauritius were in 
some ways quite similar.  They were established three years apart in the 1970s and offered similar tax 
incentives. The countries also have some social, geographical and political similarities. Both are very small 
but have favorable coastal locations for accessing developed country markets and long-standing cultural 
and economic ties to other regions of the world. Both benefited from trade preferences in developed 
countries and were not constrained by the Multi-Fiber Accord (MFA) restricting textile exports. They are 
both among the few countries that have maintained democratic elections and ethnic harmony since their 
independence in the 1960s. Yet the outcomes could not have been more different. Mauritius experienced 
major foreign investment inflows, diversification of industry, rising incomes and employment generation, 
whereas Senegal fared poorly in all these regards both within the EPZ and in the national economy.  
Mosley (2018), Frankel (2012), Bheenick and Shapiro (1991), among others, identify several 
economic and political characteristics that were crucial to the Mauritian success: 1) Tax revenue from sugar 
exports was used to finance EPZ development and increased social spending, particularly on education, 
raising domestic labor productivity and easing social tensions; 2) The foreign exchange value of the 
Mauritian remained consistently competitive; 3) Relatively well developed infrastructure 4) Domestic wage 
rates were kept low to promote labor-intensive industry, partially accomplished by exempting EPZs from 
labor legislation. There is less agreement on the role import barriers played. Most importantly, as Bheenick 
and Shapiro (1991, p.267) put it: “Above all the government must be persistent, flexible, responsive and 
realistic. An unwieldy and unprofessional bureaucracy, disdainful of market incentives, and concerned only 
with limited political considerations, would almost certainly have led to failure.”  
In contrast, economic and social policies have been much less favorable in Senegal. Senegal 
suffered from a prolonged period of currency overvaluation in Senegal following independence, eventually 
ended by a massive 50% devaluation in 1994 (Cissé, Choi, & Maurel, 2017). Infrastructure investment and 
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education lagged in Senegal. There were also major policy differences that significantly impacted the 
development of domestic industry. Mauritius’s oversight was flexible and pragmatic; in Senegal’s EPZ, 
domestic exporting firms were prohibited from entering the zone and instead faced higher taxation, further 
increasing the anti-export bias of import-protection measures (Farole, 2011; Cissé, Choi, & Maurel, 2017). 
More generally, firms in Senegal complained that the promised incentives were delivered late if at all and 
they were not in practice exempt from Senegal’s highly restrictive labor laws. 
At bottom, the institutional environment and political commitment in Mauritius was much better 
than in Senegal. While far from perfect, Mauritius featured a better business environment overall, an 
approach that has led to its description of “one big EPZ” (Madani, 1999). On the other hand, Senegal’s poor 
infrastructure, failure to deliver incentives in a timely way, and inability to insulate firms from onerous 
labor-market regulations and union agitation undermined both the zone and the single-firm free trade points 
(Farole, 2010). Overall, the Mauritian government did what it took to make the EPZ a success whereas 
Senegal was largely stymied by powerful interest groups engaged in rent-seeking. The deeper reasons for 
these institutional differences are beyond the scope of this paper.   
 
The clothing industry now consists of a booming informal sector composed of independent 
tailors working on their own or in small shops.  Their number is not known, but it probably now 
substantially exceeds 12,000, the estimated number in 1976 (Golub and Mbaye 2002).  These 
tailors are often highly skilled.  Their craft has been passed down from father to son for 
generations.  There are currently a few small-scale producers of apparel employing at most two 
hundred workers in all.   
Clothing for the Senegalese population is provided by imports, legal and illegal.  An 
increasingly large component consists of imported used clothes from developed countries 
(“friperie”) providing very cheap clothing for the poor (now estimated to be more than half the 
population).  
Reforms similar to those required for improvements in groundnuts, fishing and horticulture 
are even more essential to develop a viable clothing industry.  High formal sector wages and 
stringent labor-market regulations in Senegal are additional concerns of particular importance for 
clothing producers (Golub, Mbaye and Chwe 2015; Golub, Ceglowski, Mbaye and Prasad 2018). 
Our interviews revealed are several other problems that deter an expansion of formal-sector 
clothing production and exports, similar to those in the fishing industry:  inadequate training and 
technical assistance, lack of access to finance, and in some cases administrative hassles, unreliable 
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and slow judiciary proceedings, and conflicts with unions.  The latter problems are likely to 
increase in severity as a firm becomes larger and more “formal”, thus deterring the transition to 
the formal sector.  The high cost and unreliable supply of electricity is also a problem confronting 
small producers, for whom the cost of purchasing a generator is very burdensome.  Any hope of 
developing a competitive textile-clothing sector will depend on far-reaching improvements in the 




8 Conclusions  
 Despite favorable political and geographic circumstances and numerous ambitious reform 
plans, Senegal’s economic performance has been disappointing.  Senegal has made progress in 
opening to trade and despite some recent improvements, remains near the bottom in indicators of 
the business climate.  Per capita GDP is roughly the same as at the time of independence in the 
early 1960s.  Furthermore, what limited growth has occurred is often in capital-intensive sectors.  
Thus, as in many other Sub-Saharan African countries, lack of employment opportunities, 
especially for youth and women, is a pressing development problem.  About 90% of employment 
is in the informal sector, in agriculture and increasingly in urban areas in the form of street traders 
and other petty services with very low incomes, minimal benefits and no security. As a result, 
poverty remains elevated.  It is clear that Senegal needs stronger growth but also more labor-
intensive growth.  Recently, there have been some signs of improvement, with growth rising in the 
last few years and tentative emergence of some new sectors with employment-generating potential 
but hardly enough to make a dent in pervasive underemployment. 
Historical experience reveals the importance of growing and diversifying exports in 
boosting income and employment. Successful emerging economies include Mauritius and 
Botswana in Sub-Saharan Africa; Chile and Mexico in Latin America; and Bangladesh, China, 
Malaysia and Vietnam in Asia and Southeast Asia. In all these instances, labor-intensive exports 
played a leading role in long-term growth, sparking a cycle of investment, innovation, and poverty 
reduction. We have used the product space and previous analyses of Senegal’s economy to 
ascertain possibilities for export growth that could play a key role in raising employment.   
The product space is a representation of country’s pattern of comparative advantage and 
can be visualized in a graph with nodes that represent existing exports and a tool to identify 
potential avenues of export diversification that are “close” to current exports.  Products closeness 
is determined by the extent to which other countries with similar exports produce that good. The 
product space analysis also enables computation of the “economic complexity” of currently 
exported goods.   Product complexity refers to technological sophistication.  The presumption is 
that countries grow by mastering increasingly complex products.  In practice, complexity is 
measured indirectly by assessing the extent to which a good is produced by high-income countries.  
Thus, the product space can reveal which products are both “close” to and more “complex” than 
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currently-exported goods and thus can be used to identify possible diversification opportunities 
that will spur growth.  
While the product-space methodology is ingenious and useful as a starting point, we argue 
that it should be used with caution and supplemented with institutional and historical knowledge 
of an economy, especially for a low-income economy such as Senegal.  There are two particularly 
significant limitations of the product space approach.  First, there may be a negative relationship 
between a product’s complexity and its labor-intensity. Since employment generation is a crucial 
element of development, labor-intensity may be more important product complexity.  For this 
reason, we exclude capital-intensive products such as petroleum refining and chemical products 
from the focus of this paper even though they are a large part of current Senegalese exports. 
Second, the product space is built around the concept of reveled comparative advantage (RCA) 
that is based on the extent to which a country exports a product in a greater proportion to its total 
exports than the rest of the world in aggregate.   However, RCA can sometimes be misleading if 
examined in isolation from imports.  A country can have a high RCA while simultaneously having 
a trade deficit in that product.  In Africa especially, sometimes countries re-export goods they 
imported from abroad with minimal value added.   The product space approach fails to distinguish 
between domestically produced goods and re-exports.  Thus, while the product-space methodology 
provides a useful framework and information about potential export diversification opportunities, 
it is important to be aware of its limitations and to supplement it with in-depth knowledge of the 
economy in question. 
We adopt an eclectic approach to identifying export sectors with potential for boosting 
employment and growth using both the product pace and detailed knowledge on the history and 
current functioning of the Senegalese economy, based on our own prior research and that of others.  
Drawing on some earlier implementations of the product-space approach, we classify potential 
exports into three categories: classics, emerging champions, and marginals.  Classics are goods 
that have long been and continue to be exported.  In the case of Senegal, the most important of 
these are groundnuts/groundnut products, fish/fish products and phosphates/chemicals.  We 
largely exclude phosphates and chemicals from the analysis.  Emerging champions are goods 
which have recently witnessed rising exports.  We focus in particularly on horticulture (fruits and 
vegetables) where Senegal has recently experienced rising exports.  Marginals are goods which at 
one point may have been significant but have declined or failed to take off.  A notable marginal 
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for Senegal which we examine is textiles/clothing.  Clothing in particular is a quintessential labor-
intensive export which has served as the starting point for industrial development in countries 
around the world, and in which Senegal has seeming potential but has floundered.   
Fishing.  Senegal has some of the richest fishing grounds in the world and fishing accounts 
for about 15% of Senegal’s exports. The fishing industry plays a central socio-economic role in 
Senegal and generates a large number of jobs in fishing as well as fish processing and distribution 
that primarily employ women.  In the last 20 years, the fishing industry’s natural advantages have 
been undermined by overfishing, foreign competition, climate change, and dysfunctional local 
institutions.  The overfishing problem interacting with climate change is leading to reduced catches 
and threatens the very survival of the sector.  The government, the artisanal and the industrial 
fishing sectors must work together to confront their shared problems:  monitoring and regulation 
of fish stocks, technical assistance, infrastructure and finance.  Infrastructure has improved but 
severe deficiencies remain at the level of roads, electricity availability, and unloading and 
processing facilities for artisanal fishing.  Weaknesses in social capital, notably the capricious and 
inefficient judicial system and confrontational labor relations remain very important in hampering 
the competitiveness of the industrial fishing sector as well as other industries. The often-evoked 
financing problems would be alleviated if these other problems of physical and social 
infrastructure, appropriate regulation, and technical assistance are addressed.  While the 
government has a clear role in aiding artisanal fishing, it must strive to maintain a level playing 
field and avoid special assistance to well-connected firms.   
Groundnuts and groundnut oil.  Groundnuts have been Senegal’s signature product and 
dominant export since the colonial era until recently.  In the early years of national independence 
the groundnut industry was badly mismanaged by the government.   Over the last three decades 
the industry has been substantially liberalized but performance has remained dismal.  The main 
privatized groundnut oil producer SUNEOR has gone bankrupt after struggling for years and the 
sector has been renationalized.  An underlying problem is that Senegal has a strong comparative 
advantage in groundnuts but is less competitive in peanut oil.  This lack of competitiveness in 
peanut oil is not necessarily intrinsic as it reflects general weaknesses in the business climate noted 
in the case of fishing.  In any case, green (unprocessed) groundnuts can be much more lucrative 
than peanut oil if they are of high quality and can meet demanding sanitary and phyto-sanitary 
norms in European markets.  Unfortunately, Senegal’s green groundnuts have been barred from 
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foreign markets because of contamination with aflatoxin, a cancer-causing mold that grows on 
peanuts when they are not stored, processed and transported under proper climate-controlled 
conditions.  The aflatoxin is solvable with investments in infrastructure and adaptation of better 
technologies.  The lack of effective government support agencies and incentives for farmers has 
stymied progress.  A concerted effort by government, foreign investors and peasant associations 
is required but has yet to materialize. 
Horticulture. Favorable geographical location and climate to grow produce all year 
underpin Senegal’s significant potential to boost fruit and vegetable exports to Europe.  Opening 
of the sector to foreign investment has played a salutary role. As for groundnuts, however, stringent 
quality norms in Europe are a major impediment.  The scarcities of skilled labor, arable land, water, 
basic infrastructure, extension and other public services, and credit are also serious impediments.  
Lack of coordination between donors, the government and the private sector is a problem.  So are 
the general weaknesses in the business environment noted for fishing.   
Clothing and Textiles.  Clothing and textiles have been the stepping stone to industrial 
development since the industrial revolution and global value chains have brought developing 
countries into the process over the last 50 years in a dramatic fashion.  Senegal has a number of 
natural and historical advantages in this industry: a favorable location for export, political stability, 
lack of natural resources and hence no “resource curse”, a relatively well-developed formal 
industry inherited from the colonial era and a tradition of skilled informal tailors.  Yet the formal 
textile and clothing sector almost entirely collapsed in the face of foreign competition in the 1990s 
and has never recovered.  Senegal’s formal clothing industry was supported by high import barriers 
and the industry could not compete in the face of smuggling and the liberalization of the 1980s.  
More tellingly, unlike many other developing countries, Senegal has been unable to attract 
investment and outsourcing from global retailing chains.  The root of the problem is the 
dysfunctional investment climate: deficient infrastructure, particularly electric power outages and 
poor port functioning, burdensome labor market regulations, and lack of organized training 
facilities and thus weak human capital make Senegal unattractive to foreign investors in 
competitive, footloose industries.  Seemingly generous investment incentives are insufficient to 
offset the other weaknesses.  The comparison of export processing zones (EPZs) in Senegal and 
Mauritius is particularly revealing.  Mauritius’s EPZ thrived while Senegal’s failed to take off 
despite a number of similarities between the two.  The fundamental reason is that in Mauritius the 
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government had the independence and flexibility to implement an effective EPZ whereas in 
Senegal firms in the EPZ were not insulated from the general deficiencies in the business climate.  
In summary, despite strong comparative advantage in each of these sectors, and substantial 
opportunities to upgrade and diversify within them, we find that they all face daunting yet 
remediable constraints in the institutional environment. It is pointless to seek to diversify the 
economy in new industries until these fundamental obstacles are addressed.  The most important 
are lack of investment and maintenance of basic infrastructure, corruption, administrative 
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Table A1: All Products in Senegal’s Product Space (2014), HS Classification 
 









Animal and Vegetable Bi-Products Ground Nut Oil -1.94 41.5 1.40% 1.7 491.0 
Animal and Vegetable Bi-products Margarine -1.07 2.7 0.09% 13.9 2.8 
Animal and Vegetable Bi-Products Palm Oil -2.12 2.1 0.07% 122.0 0.3 
Animal and Vegetable Bi-Products Fish Oil -1.19 2.0 0.07% - 6.3 
Animal and Vegetable Bi-products Other Vegetable Oils -1.13 1.6 0.06% 13.3 2.7 
Animal and Vegetable Bi-Products Glycerol -0.11 0.4 0.01% 0.9 1.3 
Animal Hides Tanned Sheep Hides -2.29 11.5 0.39% 0.1 46.7 
Animal Hides Sheep Hides -1.61 10.8 0.37% 0.2 56.9 
Animal Hides Tanned Goat Hides -2.34 5.5 0.19% 0.0 27.5 
Animal Hides Equine and Bovine Hides -0.91 1.5 0.05% 0.4 1.3 
Animal Products Non-Fillet Frozen Fish -1.63 245.0 8.40% 17.4 62.8 
Animal Products Molluscs -1.42 80.0 2.70% 2.2 41.5 
Animal Products Non-Fillet Fresh Fish -1.25 51.1 1.80% 1.3 19.3 
Animal Products Crustaceans -1.94 42.0 1.40% 0.2 9.4 
Animal Products Fish Fillets -1.10 32.6 1.10% - 8.6 
Animal Products Concentrated Milk -0.79 14.0 0.48% 67.9 3.1 
Animal Products Processed Fish -1.45 9.2 0.32% 0.4 9.0 
Animal Products Fermented Milk Products -0.09 2.3 0.08% 1.5 2.9 
Animal Products Other Inedible Animal Products -0.72 0.6 0.02% - 1.5 
Arts and Antiques Sculptures 0.22 0.8 0.03% 0.2 1.7 
Chemical Products Phosphoric Acid -0.02 149.0 5.10% - 223.0 
Chemical Products Mixed Mineral or Chemical Fertilizers -0.98 31.1 1.10% 19.2 8.1 
Chemical Products Beauty Products 0.52 26.6 0.92% 8.2 4.5 
Chemical Products Packaged Medicaments 0.82 13.4 0.46% 190.0 0.5 
Chemical Products Nitrogenous Fertilizers -1.07 9.8 0.34% 56.9 2.2 
Chemical Products Antiknock 1.02 9.3 0.32% 21.5 4.2 
Chemical Products Cleaning Products 0.14 7.9 0.27% 10.9 1.5 
Chemical Products Scented Mixtures 0.29 7.4 0.25% 32.5 2.0 
Chemical Products Perfumes 0.14 5.9 0.20% 4.8 2.2 
Chemical Products Dental Products -0.04 2.7 0.094 3.7 3.1 
Chemical Products Soap -1.20 2.5 0.08% 16.9 2.2 
Chemical Products Pesticides 0.00 2.5 0.08% 17.4 0.5 
Chemical Products Enzymes 0.45 1.2 0.04% 3.8 1.4 
Chemical Products Vegetable Alkaloids 0.08 1.1 0.04% 1.5 2.9 
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Chemical Products Detonating Fuses -0.40 0.3 0.01% 0.9 1.2 
Foodstuffs Soups and Broths -0.39 100.0 3.50% 9.2 187.0 
Foodstuffs Processed Tobacco -0.49 51.7 1.80% 3.7 50.6 
Foodstuffs Rolled Tobacco -0.68 49.2 1.70% 2.3 12.9 
Foodstuffs Raw Tobacco -1.72 34.4 1.20% 66.4 16.5 
Foodstuffs Malt Extract -0.12 31.1 1.10% 141.0 9.8 
Foodstuffs Processed Fish -1.44 19.4 0.67% 1.6 7.3 
Foodstuffs Processed Crustaceans -1.63 9.4 0.32% 0.0 5.6 
Foodstuffs Animal Meal and Pellets -1.36 7.6 0.26% 1.2 7.3 
Foodstuffs Ground Nut Meal -1.82 6.3 0.22% 0.6 730.0 
Foodstuffs Chocolate 0.36 5.6 0.19% - 1.3 
Foodstuffs Baked Goods -0.30 4.6 0.16% 9.3 1.2 
Foodstuffs Sauces and Seasonings -0.49 4.3 0.15% 8.9 2.3 
Foodstuffs Coffee and Tea Extracts -0.54 2.4 0.08% - 1.8 
Foodstuffs Pasta -1.32 2.2 0.07% 8.2 1.5 
Foodstuffs Processed Tomatoes -1.02 2.1 0.07% 8.3 2.7 
Foodstuffs Other Vegetable residues -0.30 1.7 0.06% 2.7 1.3 
Foodstuffs Fruit Juice -0.82 1.3 0.08% 11.3 1.3 
Foodstuffs Alcohol >80% ABV -1.32 1.3 0.04% 0.4 1.0 
Foot- and Headwear Fake Hair -2.43 34.0 1.20% 9.7 71.2 
Foot- and Headwear Rubber Footwear -1.44 2.8 0.10% 7.7 1.1 
Foot- and Headwear Other Headwear 0.14 0.7 0.02% 0.8 1.4 
Machines Insulated Wire -0.43 16.2 0.56% 26.4 2.7 
Machines Electric Generating Sets 1.18 12.7 0.44% 44.9 2.7 
Machines Excavating Machinery 0.35 6.5 0.22% 41.5 0.3 
Machines Other Construction Vehicles -0.73 6.1 0.21% 17.5 2.9 
Machines Electric Motor Parts 0.69 4.0 0.14% 7.4 1.4 
Machines Woodworking Machines 0.65 2.4 0.08% 1.0 2.1 
Machines Water and Gas Generators 0.58 0.3 0.01% 0.9 1.8 
Metals Scrap Iron -0.73 24.3 0.84% 0.1 3.4 
Metals Raw Iron Bars -1.10 19.4 0.67% 28.0 5.5 
Metals Other Iron Bars 0.06 18.4 0.63% 5.2 34.9 
Metals Scrap Copper -1.15 13.2 0.45% - 3.1 
Metals Cold-Rolled Iron -0.02 10.3 0.35% 14.1 3.3 
Metals Copper Wire -0.32 9.8 0.34% 22.5 2.9 
Metals Hot-Rolled Iron Bars -0.24 9.7 0.33% 69.2 4.9 
Metals Other Small Iron Pipes -0.46 8.9 0.31% 11.5 2.1 
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Metals Coated Flat-Rolled Iron  0.92 8.4 0.29% 22.8 1.0 
Metals Iron Blocks -0.23 7.3 0.25% 19.4 2.9 
Metals Raw Lead -1.35 6.4 0.22% - 5.7 
Metals Scrap Aluminum -0.84 6.0 0.20% - 2.6 
Metals Hot-Rolled Iron   0.33 5.7 0.20% 12.0 4.5 
Metals Large Flat-Rolled Iron 0.97 2.0 0.07% 5.0 2.5 
Metals Iron gas containers -0.52 0.9 0.03% 5.2 1.6 
Metals Razor Blades -0.11 0.9 0.03% 2.4 1.0 
Metals Iron Ingots -0.70 0.3 0.01% - 1.6 
Mineral Products Refined Petroleum -0.95 235.0 8.10% 1300.0 1.7 
Mineral Products Cement -1.08 180.0 6.20% 0.8 83.2 
Mineral Products Calcium Phosphates -1.45 52.3 1.80% - 87.9 
Mineral Products Salt -1.15 21.5 0.74% 1.5 40.0 
Mineral Products Clays -0.48 16.7 0.58% 0.3 48.2 
Mineral Products Titanium Ore -1.70 11.5 0.40% - 32.1 
Mineral Products 
Niobium, Tantalum, Vanadium and 
Zirconium Ore -2.36 7.0 0.24% - 25.2 
Mineral Products Petroleum Coke -0.45 6.2 0.21% 28.1 1.8 
Mineral Products Petroleum Gas -2.04 6.0 0.21% 98.7 0.8 
Mineral Products Kaolin 0.04 3.4 0.12% - 11.1 
Mineral Products Petroleum Jelly -0.34 2.3 0.08% 5.8 3.5 
Mineral Products Other Mineral -1.04 2.1 0.71% - 7.1 
Mineral Products Manganese Ore -2.23 0.8 0.03% - 1.0 
Mineral Products Granite -1.03 0.6 0.02% 0.1 1.7 
Paper Goods Paper Containers -0.46 8.5 0.29% 25.3 2.4 
Paper Goods Paper Labels -0.25 1.2 0.04% 3.0 1.4 
Paper Goods Uncoated Kraft Paper 0.12 1.1 0.04% 25.6 0.5 
Paper Goods Toilet Paper 0.18 0.8 0.03% 20.1 0.2 
Plastics and Rubbers Plastic Housewares -0.73 7.9 0.27% 10.7 2.9 
Plastics and Rubbers Plastic Lids -0.46 7.8 0.27% 36.9 1.0 
Plastics and Rubbers Propylene Polymers 0.15 5.4 0.18% 27.9 0.5 
Plastics and Rubbers Other Plastic Sheeting’s 0.51 5.3 0.18% 10.2 1.3 
Plastics and Rubbers Ethylene Polymers 0.08 3.3 0.11% 39.0 0.2 
Precious Metals Gold -2.26 361.0 12.00% 0.9 6.8 
Precious Metals Silver -0.56 7.3 0.25% 0.0 1.9 
Stone and Glass Glass Bottles -0.55 2.8 0.10% 9.5 1.8 
Textiles Raw Cotton -2.41 21.7 0.75% - 8.5 
Textiles Processed Synthetic Staple Fibers 0.08 20.3 0.70% 27.1 751.0 
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Textiles Packing Bags -1.86 4.5 0.15% 15.2 5.1 
Textiles Non-Knit Women’s Undergarments -1.68 2.3 0.08% 1.2 5.8 
Textiles Awnings, Tents, and Sails -1.17 2.3 0.08% 1.2 3.9 
Textiles Wadding -0.22 1.6 0.06% 0.5 4.0 
Textiles Artificial Filament Yarn Woven Fabric -0.09 0.7 0.02% 1.4 2.5 
Transportation Planes and Helicopters 0.02 28.4 0.97% 2.2 4.2 
Transportation Delivery Trucks 0.38 13.4 0.46% 100.0 6.9 
Transportation Special-Purpose Ships -0.80 11.4 0.39% 1.4 2.0 
Transportation Cars 0.61 10.5 0.36% 177.0 0.2 
Transportation Armored Vehicles 0.55 7.2 0.25% 26.8 22.4 
Transportation Specialized Vehicles -0.63 4.3 0.15% 23.7 1.9 
Transportation Railway Cargo Containers -1.22 2.7 0.09% 9.2 4.1 
Transportation Work Trucks -0.02 2.7 0.09% 0.8 10.7 
Transportation Other Sea Vessels -0.24 0.7 0.03% 3.7 1.1 
Vegetable Products Rice -2.23 41.4 1.40% 413.0 10.1 
Vegetable Products Coconuts, Brazil Nuts, and Cashews -2.61 36.5 1.30% 0.9 33.5 
Vegetable Products Tomatoes -1.31 33.4 1.10% 0.4 21.9 
Vegetable Products Legumes -1.76 26.3 0.91% 0.2 112.0 
Vegetable Products Melons -1.64 26.0 0.89% - 49.6 
Vegetable Products Other Vegetables -1.25 21.6 0.74% 0.9 10.1 
Vegetable Products Tropical Fruit -1.87 19.9 0.62% 1.9 12.7 
Vegetable Products Ground Nuts -2.05 9.6 0.33% - 26.5 
Vegetable Products Tea -2.12 5.0 1.17% 18.1 4.4 
Vegetable Products Other Oily Seeds -2.44 4.3 0.15% - 4.6 
Vegetable Products Onions -1.81 4.1 0.14% 45.8 4.7 
Vegetable Products Insect Resins -2.52 3.7 0.13% - 25.8 
Vegetable Products Cereal Flours -1.10 3.2 0.11% 2.0 21.1 
Vegetable Products Wheat Flours -1.28 3.2 0.11% 1.3 3.9 
Vegetable Products Cassava -2.41 2.6 0.09% - 5.1 
Vegetable Products Frozen Vegetables -0.74 2.4 0.08% 0.6 2.3 
Vegetable Products Root Vegetables -0.72 2.1 0.02% - 7.4 
Vegetable Products Dried Legumes -2.06 2.0 0.07% 3.2 1.2 
Vegetable Products 
Locust Beans, Seaweed, Sugar Beet, 
Cane for Food -1.80 1.2 0.04% - 3.8 
Vegetable Products Perfume Plants -1.88 0.6 0.07% 0.1 1.2 
Vegetable Products Cereal Meal and Pellets -0.67 0.5 0.02% 13.3 2.1 
Weapons Other Firearms 0.45 0.9 0.03% 0.5 3.8 
Wood Products Plaiting Products -1.80 3.7 0.13% 0.1 46.3 
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Wood Products Plywood -0.82 1.7 0.06% 10.7 0.8 
Wood Products Basketwork -1.85 1.0 0.04% 0.2 4.1 
Wood Products Wood Ornaments -0.94 0.3 0.01% 0.1 1.0 
 
